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Articles
The Lawyer's Duty to Keep Clients
Informed: Establishing a Standard of Care
in Professional Liability Actions
Gary A. Munneket and Theresa E. Loscalzott
I. Introduction
Attorneys are in the business of providing information to
their clients. Whether they act as advocates for a client's cause,
advisors concerning a client's problem, or agents representing a
client's interest, lawyers cannot escape the pivotal role that com-
munication plays in the attorney-client relationship. When the
client needs such information to make informed decisions con-
cerning the representation, the quality of the representation is
inevitably diminished if the attorney provides inaccurate or in-
sufficient information, or no information at all.
In recent years, questions have been raised concerning the
scope of lawyers' responsibilities to provide information to cli-
ents.' If there is a duty to inform the client in certain situations,
then the failure to do so may subject the lawyer to criticism,
discipline, or malpractice liability.2
t Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Professor Josephine King for her suggestions in the preparation of this article, and
the following students who assisted in the preparation: Daw Addiego, Ann Albert, Shel-
ley Halber, Cindee Lerner, Mary Laughead and Warren Roth.
ft Associate, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia.
1. See generally Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 307 (1980); Peck, A New Tort Liability for Lack of Informed Consent in Legal
Matters, 44 LA. L. REV. 1289 (1984); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: In-
formed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979).
2. See R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 1.8 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
MALLEN]; W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32, 185-92 (5th ed. 1984).
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In the field of medical malpractice, a cause of action based
upon a breach of the doctor's duty to disclose the risks of treat-
ment has evolved. The failure of the doctor to obtain a patient's
informed consent to medical procedures, as well as an actual er-
ror in judgment, can result in liability'
There are parallels between informed consent in medical
malpractice cases in which an informed consent action is al-
lowed, and legal cases where it is not. A number of commenta-
tors have suggested that an informed consent action should be
recognized in legal malpractice. Because of historical differences
in the development of medical and legal malpractice, courts have
not recognized the right of a lawyer's client to sue for failure to
provide adequate information upon which to base decisions re-
garding the case. Commentators have proposed creation of a
cause of action grounded upon the lawyer's duty to inform and
the client's right to make fundamental decisions about the rep-
resentation.4 These writers have viewed informed consent as a
basic tenet of a broader client-centered approach to the attor-
ney-client relationship. 5
Client-centered lawyering is by no means universally ac-
cepted by practicing lawyers, who tend to view their right to
make decisions about the case much more broadly than theoreti-
cians would permit.' This presents a dilemma for the writers
3. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. Ironically, lawyers have not only
avoided liability based on a failure to provide informed consent, but also have success-
fully argued that good faith errors in judgment are not actionable either.
4. Peck, supra note 1, at 1297-1307.
5. The term "client-centered approach" appears in virtually all the literature and
course material on the subject of client interviewing and counseling. See, e.g., D. BINDER
AND S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 147-
48 (1977) [hereinafter BINDER]. See also A. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976). The basic idea is that the case belongs to the client, not
to the lawyer. The client has a right to make fundamental decisions about the represen-
tation. This participatory model shifts the balance of power in the attorney-client rela-
tionship away from the lawyer toward the client. See D. ROSENTHAL, ATTORNEY AND CLI-
ENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1977). The duty to inform flows naturally from the client's right
to control decision-making because the client must have sufficient information in order
to make rational decisions. If the lawyer does not give the client information, the client
cannot make decisions. See Martyn, supra note 1, at 312-16.
6. The traditional view suggests that because the lawyer has superior knowledge and
experience, he should make most of the decisions concerning the representation or at
least lead the client to the "correct" decision (according to the lawyer). This paternalistic
view is widely held by practicing attorneys who consider it a professional responsibility
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who have proposed a broad-based cause of action that has not
been embraced by the courts.7 It is unlikely that courts will rec-
ognize an actionable duty to inform based upon a client's right
to control the representation if a substantial segment of the
practicing bar neither subscribes nor adheres to the client-cen-
tered lawyering theory.8 It is, therefore, necessary to look be-
yond common practice in order to find a defensible rationale for
informed consent that will give rise to liability.
This Article will explore the problem of the attorney's duty
to provide clients with adequate information to make informed
decisions. It will discuss situations in which such a duty is ap-
propriate, and suggest that a cause of action for informed con-
sent must be limited to those fact patterns where courts have
established the right of the client to make the decision. The
analysis rejects establishment of a broad right of the client to
control all aspects of the representation.
The Article will first review the history of the development
of professional liability law with particular emphasis on the
medical profession, including an analysis of why informed con-
sent has evolved as a cause of action. Second, the Article will
review the development of the legal malpractice field giving par-
ticular attention to the failure of the courts to adopt a parallel
informed consent doctrine for lawyers. Third, the Article will
look at the evolution of ethical standards relating to the duty to
keep clients informed, and it will address the problem of
whether such a duty can or should be adopted as a standard of
care in a legal malpractice action. Fourth, the Article will pro-
pose a limited cause of action grounded in tort, based upon the
attorney's duty to keep the client reasonably informed in situa-
tions specifically identified in the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
to take charge of the case in order to attain their clients' objectives. Although commenta-
tors have questioned whether a lawyer can know better than the client what the client
wants, the view persists. See WATSON, supra note 5, at 142.
7. See Peck, supra note 1.
8. The professional standard of care rests upon the premise that the professional
will exercise the skill and knowledge customary in the profession. See KaXrON, supra
note 2, § 32, at 185-86. In order to establish the standard in a legal malpractice case, it is
necessary to look to the practice of other lawyers. Thus, if the custom of the profession
follows the traditional as opposed to the client-centered approach to decision-making, it
may be difficult for a plaintiff to show that the professional standard was violated. See
generally BINDER, supra note 5, at 147-55.
1989]
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sional Conduct.,
II. Background
A. Professional Liability
This is the era of the professional. Everyone, it seems,
claims special knowledge, training, or expertise in everything
from medicine to plumbing.10 In a complex industrialized soci-
ety, service differentiation, market segmentation, and specializa-
tion are increasingly necessary to solve even the most basic
problems." For example, people do not go to a lawyer any more,
or even a real estate lawyer; they seek a condo conversion spe-
cialist. When people go to professionals who claim to possess
special knowledge, they expect to (and usually do) pay a pre-
mium for that expertise. 2 They also expect a higher level of ser-
vice for their money. 3
The fundamental rationale for all professional liability cases
is that individuals who hold themselves out to others as possess-
ing greater skill, knowledge, or ability than the average person
can be held to a higher standard of care than an average person
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. See
infra notes 259-334 and accompanying text.
10. See generally KEETON, supra note 2, § 32, at 185-92.
11. Specialization in various professions has resulted in professional standard of
care actions in such fields as dentistry, veterinary medicine, pharmaceuticals, accounting,
plumbing, and architecture. Id.
12. Specialization in legal practice has not evolved as it has in medicine. In that
profession, doctors receive formal specialized training and practice in limited areas. Law-
yers, on the other hand, are presumed to be competent in all areas of the law. See
MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.1 and comment. The comment to Rule 1.1 states:
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle
legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar .... A lawyer can
provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.
Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a law-
yer of established competence in the field in question.
Id.
In reality, de facto specialization within the legal profession is not new. See 0.
MARU, RESEARCH ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A REVIEW OF WORK DONE 18 (1972). Today,
many states provide for some form of certification of specialists. Whether it is out of fear
of malpractice or a desire to make more money, lawyers increasingly are limiting their
practices to areas of special expertise.
13. See generally Comment, Legal Specialization and Certification, 61 VA. L. REV.
434 (1975).
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in the exercise of such skill, knowledge, or ability.1" If the aver-
age person can be held to a standard of ordinary care, the pro-
fessional may be held to a professional standard of care. 5 Nor-
mally, this is expressed as a duty of the professional to exercise
the ordinary skill of a reasonably prudent professional similarly
situated. 6 A breach of this professional standard of care can re-
sult in liability if the breach causes injury to the client or pa-
tient. 17 It is frequently necessary to produce expert testimony
concerning the normal practice of members of the profession in
order to establish the standard of care and breach thereof.
Most malpractice cases sound in tort. The plaintiff must
prove the fundamental elements of a tort claim: (1) the existence
of a duty to perform services with ordinary and reasonable pro-
fessional care; (2) a breach of such duty by the professional; (3)
causation of injury to the plaintiff; and (4) actual damages.' 8 In
such cases, the courts apply tort rules regarding damages, stat-
utes of limitations, and form. 9
Some cases, however, follow a contractual theory. The pro-
fessional relationship is usually based upon an agreement be-
tween the parties wherein the professional promises to perform
certain services in consideration of a fee. Thus, contract theory
can provide a basis for recovery as well.20 In some contract cases,
the action may be based upon express promises about the ser-
vices to be performed.2 In others, courts may find implied
promises in the agreement deriving from the professional rela-
tionship itself.22 In both situations, however, liability in a con-
tract action is based upon a breach of promise by the
professional.
The distinction between a contract and a tort claim is criti-
14. KEETON, supra note 2, § 32, at 185-92.
15. Id. at 185. See also MALLEN, supra note 2.
16. KEETON, supra note 2, § 32, at 187.
17. MALLEN, supra note 2, § 8.3.
18. KEETON, supra note 2, § 32, at 164-65.
19. Schnabel, Beck & Keitel, Some Aspects and Issues of Legal Malpractice, in
DEFENDING THE PROFESSIONAL 313, 364-69 (1982).
20. KEETON, supra note 2, § 32, at 186.
21. Id.
22. George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 600 P.2d 822 (1979) (attorney may be found liable
for malpractice for failure to file proper motion papers on behalf of his client, even
though no formal fee contract was ever drawn).
1989]
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cal because the two causes of action are dissimilar as to theory,
proof, and damages recoverable. In tort, the plaintiff can recover
for pain and suffering which is proximately caused by the pro-
fessional's wrongful act.28 Moreover, it is possible for such a
plaintiff to recover punitive damages.2' On the other hand, con-
tract law attempts only to restore the status quo. Damages are
generally restricted to actual payments and to the expenditures
that actually flowed from the breach of contract.26 Additionally,
different statutes of limitations may apply to contract and tort
actions, and the time of accrual of the cause of action may be
different according to the applicable statute.26
These differences arise because a tort action is based on ob-
ligations imposed by law to avoid injury to others. 27 Tort law
specifically identifies a standard of conduct that must be met in
exercising that duty.28 Contract law, on the other hand, is pre-
mised on specific promises made by the parties to each other
based on the parties' manifested intent.29 Thus, contract law as-
serts only that one of the parties failed to live up to his part of
the bargain. The result is that, under a tort theory, the plaintiff
has a greater burden of proof at trial than under a contract
theory.
Some cases impose professional liability for misrepresenta-
tions or omissions.30 In efforts to compartmentalize legal actions,
23. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
24. For example, punitive damages are often awarded in a medical malpractice ac-
tion for malfeasance and nonfeasance. See J. DOOLEY, 2 MODERN TORT LAW § 34.109
(Supp. 1988). See also DEPT. OF HEALTH, ED. AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 29 n.8 (1973).
25. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
26. Statutes of limitations and accrual rules are governed by state law. A compre-
hensive review by jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Article. For an in-depth discus-
sion of statutes of limitations and the related issue of accrual in medical malpractice
actions, see D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, §§ 13.01-13.66 (Supps.
1987 & 1989) [hereinafter LoUlSELL].
27. KEETON, supra note 2, § 92, at 655. See also id. § 4, at 20-23. Historically, a tort
action was based on the concept of fault. Id.
28. Id. § 92, at 656.
29. Id. at 655-56.
30. See, e.g., Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part
and remanded, 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973) (defendant attorney breached his fiduciary
duties to plaintiff client by failing to inform client fully of facts known to attorney which
raised serious questions regarding the advisability of client's loaning money to a corpora-
tion which owned a Nevada gambling casino).
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commentators often overlook these misrepresentation cases in
discussions of malpractice."' The essence of misrepresentation,
however, is miscommunication.2
A misrepresentation case involves a false statement of fact
upon which the plaintiff relies; an informed consent case, on the
other hand, implicates the quality of the information necessary
for the client to make rational decisions. The information does
not have to be untrue, but rather, inadequate."
One particular issue that pervades contract, tort, and mis-
representation law is the fiduciary nature of the professional re-
lationship. Because the professional claims or possesses special
knowledge, courts often find a fiduciary relationship which
places a heavier burden on the professional to act in the best
interests of the client or patient. 4 While the roots of fiduciary
duty are grounded in contract, the concept has been adopted in
31. See generally Martyn, supra note 1, at 307-08; Peck, supra note 1, at 1290.
32. KEETON, supra note 2, § 106, at 736-37.
33. An exploration of the relationship between informed consent and misrepresenta-
tion is beyond the scope of this Article. Misrepresentation, however, involves the plain-
tiff acting to his detriment because he relied upon the false statement of the defendant.
Traditionally, the misrepresentation had to be intentional. More recently, courts have
permitted recovery in negligent misrepresentation cases where the defendant, in a posi-
tion of trust or power, reasonably should have known that the plaintiff would act in
reliance on the defendant's statement. See, e.g. Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa
1985); International Products Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662, cert. denied,
275 U.S. 527 (1927). The fact that the defendant did not intend to deceive is not relevant
because a duty to ascertain the true facts is imposed on the defendant. If a lawyer mis-
states a material fact, there may be grounds for a misrepresentation action. If the lawyer
simply fails to give the client enough information, recovery on a misrepresentation the-
ory is unlikely. The anomalous result would be that a lawyer who said nothing could
escape liability while the lawyer who said the wrong thing could not.
34. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972). The issue of whether a risk should have been disclosed to the patient was to be
determined by the standard of the reasonable, prudent person in a position similar to
that of the patient. Additionally, a physician bears the duty of disclosing alternative
procedures and the risks that they encompass. Id. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held
that attorneys are obligated to scrutinize any contract which they advise their clients to
execute, and are required to disclose the full import of the instrument and the possible
consequences that may arise upon execution. Ramp v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972). The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the attor-
ney breached the applicable standard of care when he failed to inform the client of offers
by the plaintiff to settle prior to trial. Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 94 Mich. App. 419,
288 N.W.2d 443 (1979), affd. sub. nom Joos v. Drillock, 127 Mich. App 98, 338 N.W.2d
736 (1983).
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various situations in both tort and misrepresentation cases. 5 As
will be demonstrated, fiduciary principles underlie the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically regarding the
lawyer's duty to inform clients and to obtain informed consent."
These rules can provide a basis for subjecting the lawyer to civil
liability for breach of this duty to inform.
Although legal and medical malpractice cases comprise the
bulk of professional liability actions, members of many other
professional fields are subject to suit by their clients or pa-
tients.37 As other groups push to attain professional status, they
discover that one of the risks is increased exposure to malprac-
tice liability. 8 Today, virtually all professions, including both
traditional professions and newly recognized ones, are subject to
malpractice actions. Furthermore, malpractice theory has been
applied in cases involving individuals claiming special skill or
knowledge, even where the field itself does not represent an area
recognized as a profession.3
In recent years, an increase in malpractice cases has con-
tributed substantially to what has been called a rising tide of
litigation. Since 1984, insurance companies have promoted the
idea that the civil justice system is in the throes of a tort crisis.,0
Just as avidly, American trial lawyers have argued that this cri-
sis was manufactured along with the accompanying calls for tort
35. See supra note 34.
36. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rules 1.2, 1.4, 1.8.
37. See, e.g., Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978)
(professional liability action including breach of duty of a hockey coach); Tom Beuchler
Constr., Inc. v. City of Williston, 392 N.W.2d 403 (N.D. 1986) (action for breach of duty
of a building inspector); Jewell v. Beckstine, 255 Pa. Super. 238, 386 A.2d 597 (1978)
(professional liability action for breach of dairy farmer's duty).
38. See Note, Failure to Maintain Independence: A Proposed Cause of Action
Against Accountants, 62 TEx. L. REV. 923 (1984).
39. See KEETON, supra note 2, § 32, at 185-86. Persons employed as milk haulers,
expert skiers, and abstractors of titles are just a few examples of those persons who have
been held responsible to answer to a professional standard of care. Id.
40. Statistics from the Insurance Services Office, a New York based advisory, rate
making, statistical, and research service organization for property and casualty insurance
companies, show that paid losses for commercial liability insurance grew 179% from
1979 to 1985 and that general and medical professional liability paid losses were up
234% for the same period. Szabo, No Relief from the Liability Crisis, NATION'S Bus. 70
(Oct. 1986). For more information concerning trends in the insurance industry, see
Freedman, General Liability and Medical Malpractice Insurance Marketing - 1985,
BEST'S REV. 32 (Oct. 1986).
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reform."1
Although the battle of tort reform seems to be waning, the
debates have highlighted a number of considerations concerning
malpractice law. First, the number of malpractice cases has in-
creased dramatically, not only in traditional areas but in new
fields as well.2 Second, damage awards have increased signifi-
cantly over the past decade."3 Third, insurance premiums have
escalated" in response to what carriers viewed as a threat to
their financial stability." One theory suggests that as society be-
comes more informed through widespread availability of infor-
mation, individuals are becoming more aware of their rights and
are willing to assert them through legal action."" In a society
where the rule of law becomes more accepted, the tendency of
people to utilize the courts will increase, while the tendency to
resolve problems through self-help will decrease. It may be that
the prospect of large damage awards provides an incentive for
people to sue. If people view legal action as an opportunity to
make a profit from their misfortunes, rather than merely to
compensate them for their losses, they are likely to enter the
litigation sweepstakes.
One factor that cannot be ignored is that the number of
lawyers has mushroomed. In 1960, there were approximately
286,000 lawyers.'7 In 1980, the number had increased to
542,000."8 By the year 2000, there will be over 1,000,000 lawyers
41. See McKay, Litigation Explosion?: ABA House to Review Tort Report, Nat'l
L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 17, col. 1. The buzz words "litigation explosion," "malpractice
crisis," "tort reform," and others that have been tossed about during this debate, often
obscure the fundamental facts that individual lawsuits are brought by people who be-
lieve they have been injured; courts have means of dealing with frivolous and unmeritori-
ous claims; and damage awards demonstrate that the plaintiff has proved his case in
court. Id.
42. Such diverse professionals as pharmacists, veterinarians, and abstractors of title
have found themselves victims of this wave of litigation. KEE'rON, supra note 2, § 32, at
185-86.
43. See Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 21
(1986).
44. Szabo, supra note 40.
45. See generally Galanter, supra note 43.
46. People are more aware of their duties as well, but, ironically, crime has in-
creased. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS NAT'L CRIME SURVEY, NAT'L CRIME
SURVEY (1989).
47. G. GREENWOOD, THE 1961 LAWYER'S STATISTICAL REPORT (1961).
48. B. CURRAN, THE LAWYERS STATISTICAL REPORT- A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE
1989]
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in the United States." This increase in number has produced a
much wider availability of legal services.
When the number of lawyers was smaller, there were simply
fewer attorneys to represent injured individuals. The increased
accessibility of potential clients to legal services has been further
expedited by the erosion of rules against lawyer advertising.8 0 In
a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that
attorneys are free to advertise their services as long as their ads
are not false, deceptive, or misleading." State regulation of such
activities must be narrowly drawn if it is permitted at all.5 2 One
result of the open environment created by the law on advertising
has been the development of marketing mania.53 Almost over-
night, law firms that considered "advertising" tawdry and un-
professional embraced the concept of "marketing" with open
arms. 5 Today, firms of all sizes regularly address the problems
of marketing their services to prospective clients.5 5 The overall
effect of the marketing revolution has been that lawyers are not
only promoting their services more actively, but also more effi-
ciently. 6 The relationship between marketing and the rise in
malpractice litigation remains unclear, but the facts suggest a
positive correlation.5 7
U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980s 4 (1985).
49. Id. The projections go only to 1995 when it is predicted that the lawyer popula-
tion will reach 930,000. The projections show a growth in the profession of more than
125,000 for each five year period from 1980 forward, suggesting that the one millionth
lawyer will be admitted some time around 1997 or 1998.
50. See generally L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SO-
LICITATION 77-78 (1980); H. HAYNSWORTH, EXPANDING YOUR PRACTICE: THE ETHICAL RISKS
(1984).
51. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bates & O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
52. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
53. Marketing and advertising are not the same. Advertising represents a permissi-
ble way to market legal services. In-person solicitation represents an impermissible way.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978). Popular literature is replete
with articles advising law firms how to market their services. See, e.g., McCrensky, Cohe-
siveness Necessary for Successful Marketing, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 13, 1989, at 20, col. 1.
There is even a national organization of law firm marketing administrators. Whatever
onus the term "advertising" may have carried, marketing has attained no such infamy.
54. See generally R. DENNEY, How TO MARKET LEGAL SERVICES (1984).
55. See generally A. ANDERSON, MARKETING YOUR PRACTICE (1987).
56. Id.
57. Marketing legal services may have implications for professional liability actions.
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Informed consent is related conceptually to two other
rights: the right of autonomy and the right to information. Both
of these rights are founded on the notion that the individual
should control his or her own destiny, and that it is necessary to
recognize a body of rights in order to assure that control. While
legislative and judicial recognition of these rights has helped to
establish them, the impetus for their creation came largely from
a grassroots movement.5
8
The concept of autonomy suggests that individuals should
have control over the basic personal elements of their existence.
Constitutionally, autonomy has been recognized within the pe-
numbra of certain fundamental rights." In the medical malprac-
tice area, autonomy has been articulated as the basis for the
right to control one's body which is integral to the concept of
medical informed consent.60 It is the unfettered right of the indi-
vidual to control his or her own body that gives rise to the doc-
tor's duty to disclose the risks involved in a proposed medical
procedure. At least one commentator has proposed that auton-
omy can provide the basis for legal informed consent as well."1
While this Article rejects the notion that the lawyer's client has
a right to control all aspects of the case, the authors recognize
If advertising raises the expectations of clients, it follows that they would be more likely
to sue if their expectations are not met than they would be if their expectations were
lower. Generally, when a lawyer holds herself out as possessing certain expertise, she may
be held to that standard. In one sense, marketing involves the lawyer convincing poten-
tial clients that she is competent to handle their legal problems. If she fails to perform, a
malpractice action is a predictable result.
58. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the plaintiff sought to overturn a state
abortion law. Thus, in one sense, the case represents an individual effort to assert greater
control over the fundamental right of self-determination.
59. See, e.g., id. The Court has held that "a State violates the Equal Protection
Clause . . . whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an
electoral standard." Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
The Court has stated that "we are one people, with one common country ... and as
members of the same community must have the right to pass and repass through every
part of it without interruption .... " Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 48-49 (1867) (cita-
tion omitted). Furthermore, the Court has held that an Arizona statute requiring one
year residency in the state as a prerequisite to receive non-emergency medical care at
state expense unconstitutional. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974).
60. See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549
(1959).
61. See Martyn, supra note 1, at 319.
1989]
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that autonomy is a factor in the client's decision to control some
elements of the representation.
The right to information is conceptually similar to auton-
omy in that it is based upon the existential notion that individu-
als have the right to determine their own destiny. However, au-
tonomy and fundamental rights go to the individual's physical
security, while the right to information addresses an intellectual
state involving access to information. Since one cannot exercise
rational choices or self-determination without adequate informa-
tion, to give someone the freedom of choice while withholding
important information is a hollow gift indeed.
Various states have enacted laws guaranteeing citizens the
right to information, including acts providing access to govern-
ment documents and personal files, credit reporting acts, open
meeting acts, and sunshine acts.2 No two states have ap-
proached the problem identically; the net result has been a
patchwork of laws that say generally that people have a right to
obtain information they need to make rational choices about
their lives. The same idea runs through the Federal Freedom of
Information Act. 3
The notion that citizens in a democracy have a right to in-
formation is not a new concept. It may be found in the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of the press."' Even earlier, it can be
seen in the law of libel which recognizes a number of privileges:
an absolute privilege in judicial proceedings, 5 a qualified privi-
lege to report on official and government meetings, 6 and a quali-
fied privilege to report fairly on events of public interest.6 7 What
has come to be known as the public's right to know is basically a
right to information necessary to make informed decisions.
It is important to understand that information rights are
not recent legislative innovations. The action has both constitu-
tional and common-law roots of long-standing duration. Modern
62. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-10-314, 25-19-105 (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 29, § 100.02 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344 (Supp. 1989); WYo. STAT. § 16-4-
202 (1982).
63. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1977 & Supp. 1989).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65. KEETON, supra note 2, § 114, at 816-19.
66. Id. § 115, at 836-38.
67. Id. § 115, at 830-35.
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statutory enactments68 have broadened these rights considera-
bly, but the underlying principle is not new.
The advent of electronic media and mass communication
have revolutionized the relationship between people and infor-
mation.69 As information has become more readily available, in-
dividuals have inherited a greater potential to exercise power
concerning events in their lives. To the extent that people are
aware of their rights, they are less willing to delegate decisions
about those rights to others. They are also more willing to utilize
the judicial system to protect or vindicate their rights. Although
there may be other reasons, this phenomenon has been a factor
in fueling the litigation explosion of recent years.
There is clearly a tension between the individual's right to
information and the power of the government, employers, or
professionals to control access to information. It is not surprising
that this allocation of power should be fought out in the courts.
Professionals hold themselves out as possessing special
knowledge and information, which they exercise for the benefit
of their clients and patients. Traditionally, the professional used
his superior information paternalistically, withholding from the
client-patient information that was too difficult to understand or
appreciate. It followed that the professional made most of the
decisions about the representation. As more information became
available to clients and patients, they sought greater authority
to make decisions, and they became more willing to second-
guess decisions made for them. This second-guessing arises spe-
cifically when the professional is sued for malpractice.
The "malpractice crisis" of the 1980's in one sense is a man-
ifestation of this conflict over control of access to information
and decision-making power. 70 The increase in professional liabil-
ity suits is one product of this tug-of-war.71 Attorneys must now
consider the quality of information they provide clients. The
68. Id.
69. See generally M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA. THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN
(1964); A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 136-61 (1970). A number of authors have pointed out
that people are awash in a sea of information to a degree that it cannot all be processed.
Yet, citizens have instant access to so much information that it has transformed the way
they relate to government and each other.
70. See generally MALLEN, supra note 2, §§ 11.2, 12.13, 13.27.
71. Id. § 11.2.
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practical effects of this development are predictable. Attorneys
are more likely to reduce representation and fee agreements to
writing.72 They are less willing to put legal advice into writing7"
or give off-the-cuff advice.7 4 They are more likely to eschew
cases they believe to be outside their fields of expertise.7
Given the likelihood of adverse liability judgments resulting
in increased malpractice insurance premiums or financial ruin,
many lawyers have taken the conservative road in their dealings
with clients. Defensive practices also lead attorneys to file every
conceivable motion, make every plausible argument, and pursue
every possible theory in a case.76 In order to protect themselves
from malpractice suits, attorneys may even adopt strategies sug-
gested by clients that they would not otherwise have
considered.77
72. Id. § 2.9, at 78. In fact, they are so required in some cases. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 9, at 1.5(b), (c), (e)(1). In Pennsylvania, all fee agreements must be in writing
when the lawyer has not regularly represented the client in the past. Penn. Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5(b)(1988).
73. MALLEN, supra note 2, § 2.9. Ironically, the trend seems to be to increase formal
communications that protect the lawyer's interests (for example, fee agreements), and
reduce formal communications that expose the lawyer to a greater risk of liability (for
example, opinion letters). It is not uncommon for a lawyer to reduce to writing conversa-
tions with clients in which the client gives instructions or makes demands. The writing
may take the form of a confirmation or memo to file.
74. Id. § 2.30.
75. Id.
76. See generally Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292 (1963).
77. It is not necessarily bad that attorneys are more thorough as a result of in-
creased exposure to the risk of malpractice. On the other hand, if the lawyer's tactics are
based on self-protection rather than the client's interests, the added benefit to the client
may be negligible. In fact, if such practices result in increased costs of litigation, delayed
resolution of disputes, or increased acrimony among litigants, defensive practices by the
attorney may even be deleterious to the client's best interests. In order to reduce unnec-
essary, frivolous and harassing litigation tactics, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
now state:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record .... The signature of an attor-
ney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, infor-
mation and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Courts today increasingly impose sanctions against attorneys for a variety of con-
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss3/2
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A new balance of power has evolved. Lawyers today must
provide enough information to allow clients to make rational
choices about their cases. If clients assume greater responsibility
for their representation, they must also assume greater responsi-
bility for the consequences of their decisions.78 The era of pater-
nalistic attorney-client relationships is slowly giving way to a
participatory model. 71
In terms of the litigation explosion, clients who want a
greater degree of participation in decisions may be more willing
to sue their lawyers when they feel that they have been denied
such participation and have been injured thereby. Although
most legal malpractice litigation has focused on negligent prac-
tice, there is growing sentiment to hold lawyers to a reasonable
standard of care with respect to the information they provide
and the decisions they take upon themselves to make."0
These developments in the field of legal malpractice parallel
changes in medical malpractice law." In fact, doctors faced the
problems associated with rising expectations of patients to par-
ticipate in their treatment long before lawyers.
B. The Law of Medical Malpractice
1. Historical Development and Overview
At common law, a physician's liability" was premised on
the notion that the medical profession was a "public" or "coin-
duct that may be predicated upon the lawyer's desire to cover every base. Rule 11 bal-
ances the interests of zealous advocacy against the need to prevent frivolous actions.
78. Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194 (Ala. 1988). An attorney hired by an insur-
ance company to defend an insured doctor in a medical malpractice case is not liable to
the doctor for settling the case without his permission. The Alabama Supreme Court
recently held that the doctor had signed a policy with the insurance company which
expressly granted the attorney the right to accept a settlement offer without consulting
the doctor. Id. at 196-97.
79. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 5; BINDER, supra note 5, at 150.
80. See generally Peck, supra note 1.
81. See, e.g., Sapp, Medical Malpractice Crisis: Rethinking Issues and Alternatives,
55 DEF. COUNS. J. 373 (1988); Pavalon, Another "Reform" - The Assault Continues 24
TRIAL 5 (Apr. 1988).
82. Unlike professional liability generally, medical malpractice liability assumes a
physician-patient relationship. See Easter v. Lexington Memorial Hosp., 303 N.C. 303,
278 S.E.2d 253 (1981). At least one court has held that the husband of a pregnant pa-
tient is the direct beneficiary of the duty imposed by the physician-patient relationship.
See Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 471 N.E.2d 530 (1984), afl'd, 113 Ill. 2d
1989]
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mon" calling, similar to that of a common carrier or innkeeper."3
But as the body of American jurisprudence developed, American
courts increasingly began to analyze the physician's liability in
terms of breach of contract.8
Contract is still available as the underlying basis of liability
where there is an implied or express agreement between the
physician and the patient.8 5 Various courts have recognized ex-
press contracts between patients and physicians when the physi-
cian has promised to achieve a specific or definite result for the
patient.86 In addition, a contract may be implied by law between
a physician and a patient where no special agreement exists be-
tween the parties.8 7 Today, however, medical malpractice actions
are generally based on tort concepts.18
Specifically, medical malpractice is viewed as a breach of a
physician's duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in the
treatment of a patient.8 9 This skill and knowledge represents the
criteria that constitute "that special form of competence which
is not part of the ordinary equipment of the reasonable man, but
which is the result of acquired learning, and aptitude developed
by special training and expertise." 90
Physicians must act with a level of skill and learning com-
482, 499 N.E.2d 406 (1986). Other courts recognize a duty to the patient's unborn fetus.
Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 64-65, 432 A.2d 834, 839 (1981). See infra, note 144.
83. See KEETON, supra note 2, § 28, at 161.
84. KEETON, supra note 2, § 28, at 161.
85. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
86. KEETON, supra note 2, § 32, at 186. Often cases involving procreation issues,
such as tubal ligations and vasectomies, fall into this category. See, e.g., Mason v. West-
ern Penn. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981) (pregnancy followed tubal
ligation); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979) (unsuccessful vasec-
tomy), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
87. Fala, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Pennsylvania, 36 U. PiTt. L. REV. 203,
205-08 (1974). Whether or not there is an implied contract is a factual question that
must be determined by the trier of fact. See Beadling v. Sirotta, 71 N.J. Super. 182, 176
A.2d 546 (1961), vacated on other grounds, 39 N.J. 34, 186 A.2d 680 (1962) (to be deter-
mined by judge); Pfeiffer v. Kraske, 139 Pa. Super. 92, 11 A.2d 555 (1940) (to be deter-
mined by the jury).
88. KEETON, supra note 2, § 28, at 160.
89. LOUISELL, supra note 26, §§ 8.04-05. This standard applies generally to all pro-
fessionals. See, e.g., Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 255, 72 N.W.2d 364, 368
(1955) (accountants); Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12
VAND. L. REV. 711, 716 (1959) (architects and engineers).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment a (1965).
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monly possessed by members of the profession in good standing.
But it is not malpractice where competent professionals differ on
the proper course of action and the physician merely chooses
one of two acceptable alternatives. 91 Thus, where there are con-
flicting schools of medical thought on a given issue, the doctor's
level of skill and competence must be judged by reference to the
beliefs of the school that he follows. 92 And where a physician
holds himself out as a specialist he will be held to the minimum
standard of care of that specialty. 3
A physician's professional negligence must be shown
through expert testimony."" This, of course, is an extremely diffi-
cult burden for the plaintiff to carry due to what has been called
the "conspiracy of silence" among physicians.9 '
Until recently, doctors were generally bound only to the
professional standard of care prevailing in the community in
which they practiced. 6 Many jurisdictions have expanded this
rule to a standard based on the skill and competence of physi-
cians practicing in similar communities.97 This rule is eroding
91. KEETON, supra note 2, § 32, at 186-87.
92. Id. § 32, at 187. But note that a doctor cannot establish his own "school of
thought." "A 'school' must be a recognized one within definite principles, and it must be
the line of thought of a respectable minority of the profession." Id.
93. The standard of care of a specialist has been articulated as that of a "reasonable
specialist practicing medicine in the light of present day scientific knowledge." Swanek v.
Hutzel Hosp., 115 Mich. App. 254, 320 N.W.2d 234, 236 (1982)(citation omitted).
94. There are noted exceptions, however, to the expert testimony requirement. For
instance, one exception is where the negligence is obvious to the layman; i.e., if the de-
fendant's negligence is so blatant that the court determines as a matter of law that a
layman could identify it as such. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687
(1944).
95. "[A]s a practical matter, we must consider the plaintiff's difficulty in finding a
physician who would breach the 'community of silence' by testifying against the interest
of one of his professional colleagues." Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 267, 286
A.2d 647, 650 (1971). For an extensive discussion of the conspiracy of silence see gener-
ally Kelner, The Silent Doctors - The Conspiracy of Silence, 5 U. RiCH. L. REV. 119
(1970); Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 520 (1965).
96. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981). See generally McCoid,
The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 569-75 (1959). This
was known as the "strict locality" rule.
97. "Plaintiff has the burden to prove what a reasonable medical practitioner of the
same school and same or similar community, under the same or similar circumstances,
would have disclosed to his patient." Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super. 242, 257, 232
A.2d 840, 848 (App. Div. 1967) (emphasis added), aff'd, 51 N.J. 404, 241 A.2d 235 (1968).
See Priest v. Lindig, 583 P.2d 173 (Alaska 1978); Bartimus v. Paxton Community Hosp.,
120 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 458 N.E.2d 1072 (1983); LeBlanc v. Lentini, 82 Mich. App. 5, 266
1989]
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
quickly, however, and many jurisdictions now hold the defend-
ant to the standard of care recognized nationally in the profes-
sion.98 Regardless of whether a local or national standard is ap-
plied, the traditional medical malpractice case focuses on the
quality of the professional service.
2. Development of the Informed Consent Theory
Informed consent is a "distinct specie of liability" separate
and apart from the traditional medical malpractice action.99
Traditional malpractice actions could not, and did not ade-
quately address the plight of the patient who suffered injury re-
sulting from the doctor's failure to disclose the risks involved in
a proposed course of treatment. If the patient had in fact con-
sented to the procedure, his consent was regarded as a bar to
recovery if he had no clear understanding of the implications of
the information he was given. Consent under these circum-
stances was the antithesis of the recognized concept of auton-
omy and individual rights.10 °
Over a period of time, the doctrine of informed consent
emerged requiring the physician to give the patient information
concerning: (1) the diagnosis; (2) the general nature of the con-
templated procedure; (3) the risks involved; (4) the prospects of
success; (5) the prognosis if the procedure was not performed;
and (6) any alternatives available. 0 1 Informed consent recog-
nizes and maximizes the role of the patient in the decision-mak-
N.W.2d 643 (1978); Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978).
98. See, e.g., Lane v. Otts, 412 So. 2d 254 (Ala. 1982); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp.
Ass'n, 191 Conn. 282, 465 A.2d 294 (1983); Morrison v. MacNamera, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C.
1979); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872 (Miss. 1985).
99. LOuiSELL, supra note 26, § 22.01 (Supp. 1987).
100. LIDZ, MEISEL, ZERVLANCK, CARTER, SESTAK & ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT'. THE
LEGAL DOCTRINE (1984).
Informed consent is an ethical as well as a legal imperative. It had deep strong
roots in the individualistic tradition of the English common law tradition reflected
in and reinvigorated by the American constitution. Informed consent is a legal
mandate .... Informed consent reflects one of our highest social values, individ-
ual autonomy. It reflects a strong emotional need for a sense of control over our
own lives and an admission of our dependence upon others, and it deals with a
subject of fundamental importance, our health.
Id at 10.
101. LOUISELL, supra note 26, § 22.01 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)).
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ing process.
Historically, the doctrine of informed consent was grounded
in concepts of assault and battery."0 2 But the thrust of the in-
formed consent action gradually evolved to focus on the quality
of the consent, rather than the nature of the unauthorized
touching. Thus, an informed consent action today sounds in neg-
ligence rather than in battery. 10 s Because it is the singular mech-
anism by which a patient grants the physician the power to
act,104 consent is the crux of the issue. And informed consent
focuses on the quality of that consent.0 "
102. See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Schloendorff v. Soci-
ety of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). In Schloendorff the court stated:
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his pa-
tient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id. at 93 (citations
omitted). A patient's cause of action against his physician will still sound in battery
where there is no consent at all. See generally Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295
(Minn. 1986) (discussing battery cause of action); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, (Okla.
1979) (completely unauthorized treatment is battery).
103. At least one court has recognized a cause of action against a physician sounding
in negligent misrepresentation. See Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 914 (Colo. 1982). In
Bloskas, the court held that Section 311 of the Second Restatement of Torts, "Negligent
Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm," was applicable to the physician-
patient relationship where the physician asserted that he had prior experience perform-
ing ankle replacement surgery when, in fact, he had none and the patient reasonably
relied on the physician's representations in deciding to undergo surgery which ultimately
resulted in leg amputation. Id. Actions for fraud and deceit may also be viable claims
when the physician intentionally misrepresents facts to the patient. See Hedin v. Minne-
apolis Medical & Surgical Inst., 62 Minn. 146, 64 N.W. 158 (1895). See also Katz, In-
formed Consent - A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PmTT. L. Rav. 137, 147-48 (1977).
104. Pratt v, Davis, 118 111. App. 161, 166 (1905), afl'd, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562
(1906).
[T]he free citizen's first and greatest right, which underlies all others - the right to
the inviolability of his person, in other words, his right to himself - is the subject
of universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon,
however skillful or eminent, who has been asked to examine, diagnose, advise and
prescribe (which are at least necessary first steps in treatment and care), to violate
without permission the bodily integrity of his patient ... without his consent or
knowledge.
Id.
105. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972). "True consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice,
and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the
risks attendant upon each." Id.
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3. Elements
As in any other tort involving negligence, the patient must
prove all four elements of negligence to recover under an in-
formed consent theory: (1) duty - the plaintiff must establish
that the doctor owed him a specific duty of care to disclose spe-
cific information; (2) breach of duty - the plaintiff must show
that the physician breached that duty of care by failing to make
an adequate disclosure; (3) proximate cause - the plaintiff must
establish a causal connection between the act of the physician
and the injury sustained; and (4) damage - the plaintiff must
establish that he has suffered actual loss or damage."'
a. Duty and Breach
Under the informed consent theory, there are two separate
duty elements: (1) the duty of the physician to obtain the pa-
tient's consent to the treatment proposed; and (2) the duty of
the physician to inform the patient of all material factors con-
cerning the treatment. 107 This duty of reasonable disclosure is an
inherent part of the physician's overall responsibility to the
patient.'
Because a key to valid consent is the requirement that the
patient be adequately informed, the emergence of the informed
consent doctrine required the courts to devise guidelines to de-
termine the specific information that physicians had to disclose
106. See KEETON, supra note 2, § 30, at 164-65.
107. What is "material" is not always clear, and is often judged by different stan-
dards. In the landmark case of Canterbury v. Spence, the court addressed materiality:
"[T]he test for determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality
to the patient's decision: all peril potentially affecting the decision must be unmasked."
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87. But whether this is judged from an objective or subjec-
tive standard varies by jurisdiction. See infra notes 116, 319-24 and accompanying text.
See also Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410-11, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106-07 (1960).
In considering the obligation of a physician to disclose and explain to the patient
in language as simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, the nature of the
proposed treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives, and perhaps
the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the body, we do
not think the administration of such an obligation, by imposing liability for mal-
practice if the treatment were administered without such explanation where ex-
planation could reasonably be made, presents any insurmountable obstacles.
Id. (emphasis added).
108. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (the rela-
tionship between a physician and his patient is of a fiduciary nature).
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to their patients. The criteria for disclosure differ from state to
state due to both legislation and case law." 9 Basically, there are
two standards of disclosure: (1) the professional standard, which
is traditionally applied in medical malpractice actions; 0 and (2)
the reasonable patient standard."'
(i) The Professional Standard
Initially, the professional standard was applied in informed
consent cases."' Under this standard, the physician's duty of
disclosure is defined only by the standards of his colleagues." 3
What the reasonable patient might deem important is of no rele-
vance. Therefore, a patient attempting to prove that the physi-
cian violated this duty is required to produce expert testimony
that establishes the standard medical procedure in such a case,
and then offer proof that the physician deviated from such
practice. 14
Under the professional standard, disclosure should be based
109. Various jurisdictions have enacted informed consent statutes delineating the
standards of disclosure and causation. For a comprehensive survey of informed consent
statutes, see LOUISELL, supra note 26, 22.17-22.68 (Supp. 1987).
110. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text; see infra notes 112-15 and ac-
companying text.
111. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
112. The earliest case recognizing the duty of informed consent was Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Junior Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). In
Salgo, the court held that a physician had a duty to disclose "any facts which are neces-
sary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treat-
ment." Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181. The Salgo court premised the duty of disclosure on
the traditional malpractice professional standard of care. The physician had only the
duty to inform a patient in compliance with whatever the prevailing medical practice was
in the community.
113. As noted previously, jurisdictions differ on what geographic scope should be
considered in determining the "standards of his colleagues." See supra notes 96-98 and
accompanying text.
114. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), was the first major case
in which this practice was applied to assess the adequacy of the information disclosed
prior to consent. In Natanson, the physician failed to disclose the hazards inherent in
cobalt radiation treatment, which at the time was both new and untried. Id at 397, 350
P.2d at 1096-97. The patient suffered serious side effects and sued alleging that her con-
sent was invalidated by her lack of knowledge of the dangers. Id at 400, 350 P.2d at 1100.
The cause of action was framed as a claim of assault and battery, but the court ad-
dressed it as an issue of professional negligence. The burden of establishing the recog-
nized professional standard of care (through expert testimony) was placed on the pa-
tient. Id at 410, 350 P.2d at 1106.
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
on medical judgment. Its proponents argue, first, that it is not
feasible for a physician to determine what a reasonable person
would want to know, and second, that the disclosure of informa-
tion necessary for a valid consent should be cast in light of what
the health care professional deems important to the patient and
to the patient's well-being. Although the professional standard is
the traditional and so-called majority rule, it is being rejected
rapidly in favor of the patient need standard.11
(ii) The "Patient Need" or Reasonable Patient Standard
The reasonable patient standard focuses on the informa-
tional needs of the average reasonable patient rather than on
professionally established standards of disclosure. This standard
requires that the physician disclose all material information.1 '
Canterbury v. Spence1 7 refuted the propriety of the profes-
sional standard of care rule." 8 In addressing the issue of the
physician's standard of disclosure, the court states:
There are, in our view, formidable obstacles to acceptance of the
notion that the physician's obligation to disclose is either germi-
nated or limited by medical practice. To begin with, the reality of
any discernible custom reflecting a professional consensus on
communication of option and risk information to patients is open
to serious doubt. We sense the danger that what in fact is no cus-
tom at all may be taken as an affirmative custom to maintain si-
lence, and that physician-witnesses to the so-called custom may
state merely their personal opinions as to what they or others
would do under given conditions .... Nor can we ignore the fact
that to bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arro-
115. See Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367 (S.D. 1985). See also ROZOVSKY,
CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 41-42 (1984).
116. As previously noted, "material" information is a rather esoteric concept that is
defined somewhat differently under different views of causation. See supra note 107 and
accompanying text. Under the patient need/objective view, disclosure is required of all
information that a reasonable person (in the position which the physician knew or
should have known to be that of the patient) would deem significant in making a deci-
sion. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972). The patient need/
subjective standard requires disclosure of all information which the patient himself
would deem significant in making a decision. See e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554
(Okla. 1979).
117. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
118. Id. at 786-87. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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gate the decision on revelation to the physician alone. Respect for
the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy de-
mands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which
physicians may or may not impose upon themselves. '
A significant aspect of the Canterbury decision is that the
standard articulated relieves the patient of the burden of intro-
ducing expert testimony concerning the professional standard in
the community.'20  Many jurisdictions now apply this
standard. 2 '
b. Causation
No matter which disclosure standard is employed, there
must be some causal connection between the physician's failure
to disclose and the injury suffered. Although almost all jurisdic-
tions now recognize the concept of informed consent, there is a
lack of consistency in both the standard to be applied in deter-
mining proper disclosure of information, and in the application
of standards determining causality.
Essentially, there are two standards of causality: subjective
and objective. Many jurisdictions adhere to the objective stan-
dard.'2 2 The objective theory inquires what a reasonable person
in the plaintiff's position would have done if information about
119. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783-84 (footnotes omitted). In Canterbury, the minor
plaintiff consulted a neurosurgeon, Spence, for severe upper back pain. Diagnosis indi-
cated a spinal defect and the defendant physician told the patient that surgery was nec-
essary to correct the problem. The patient neither objected to nor questioned the recom-
mended procedure. Id. at 777 The surgeon obtained consent from the patient's mother
after she asked about the possible dangers and was told that the proposed surgery was
no more dangerous than any other operation. While recovering from surgery, Canterbury
fell and became paralyzed from the waist down. Canterbury then sued Spence on a the-
ory of informed consent. The appellate court held that the failure to disclose a specific
risk of paralysis raised a triable issue of fact as to the validity of the consent. Id. at 794.
120. "Experts are unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient's
decision on treatment, or to the reasonably expectable effect of risk disclosure on the
decision." Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 792; see also Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295
A.2d 676, 688 (1972) (variability of physician-patient relationship eliminates need of
showing what other doctors would have done with other patients).
121. Cf. Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367 (S.D. 1985) (noting trend rejecting
professional standard, the court adopts patient need standard, but requires expert testi-
mony to establish some elements of cause of action).
122. See generally Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From
Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. RE V. 51, 109-11
(1977).
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the risk had been disclosed. 2 3 If it can be demonstrated that a
reasonable person would have consented to the treatment, the
plaintiff cannot prevail.
The subjective theory is based on what the patient himself
would have done if adequate information had been disclosed. 2 "
Under this theory, if an injured plaintiff assured the physician
that he wanted the treatment regardless of the risk involved, or
if the plaintiff himself chose not to receive the information, the
plaintiff would have no cause of action due to a lack of
causation.
c. Injury
The final element of an informed consent action requires
proof that the plaintiff suffered an injury represented by actual
damages. Even if the plaintiff can establish a duty to disclose,
demonstrate that the doctor breached the duty, and show that
the procedure employed actually caused an unwanted result,
there can be no recovery without a showing of a loss subject to a
monetary compensation. "The risk [of harm] must actually ma-
terialize and plaintiff must have been injured as a result of sub-
mitting to the treatment.11 2 5 Therefore, despite the occurrence
of an unwanted result, if there are no damages, the failure of the
physician to disclose the risk is not actionable.' 6 What this
means is that when informed consent evolved as a negligence ac-
tion, the elements of negligence (including the requirement of
actual damages) applied. If the gravamen of the action were bat-
tery, then damages could be awarded for the nonconsensual
touching, even if those damages were nominal.
123. See supra note 116. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983); Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787; Nickell v. Gonzalez, 17
Ohio St. 3d 136, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (1985). Some jurisdictions have statutorily imposed
standards. See Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150 (Ala. 1985). The court in Fain interpreted
the statute to "mean reasonable person with all the characteristics of the plaintiff, in-
cluding his idiosyncracies and religious beliefs .. " Id. at 1155.
124. See supra note 116. See, e.g., Smith v. Reisig, 686 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1984); Scott
v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
125. Scott, 606 P.2d at 559.
126. Id.
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4. Exceptions to the Informed Consent Requirement
Four major exceptions relieve the physician of the duty to
obtain informed consent. 2  These exceptions are recognized as
affirmative defenses to an informed consent action, and the phy-
sician bears the burden of proof...8 In many jurisdictions the ex-
ceptions are statutorily prescribed. 29
One of the clearly recognized exceptions is the emergency
doctrine. A physician has implied consent to act where: (1) the
patient is unconscious or otherwise without capacity to make a
decision; and (2) no one legally authorized to act for the patient
is available; and (3) delay in treatment would seriously jeopard-
ize the patient; and (4) a reasonable person would consent under
the circumstances.' 30 A second recognized exception is the thera-
peutic privilege. Where the disclosure itself would be harmful to
the best interests of the patient, a physician may withhold dis-
closure.'' This privilege confers significant discretion on the
physician in making a determination whether disclosure would
be harmful. Third, a defense is recognized where the risk is
known or reasonably should have been known by the patient.3 2
Similarly, where the risk is common to all operations and is a
risk of which average persons would already be aware, the excep-
tion applies. 133
It is possible also for a patient to waive the right to give an
informed consent. A patient can waive that right prior to treat-
ment by affirmatively indicating that he does not want to be in-
formed. He can waive that right subsequently by indicating that
127. For an extensive discussion of these exceptions, see Meisel, The Exceptions to
the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in
Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413.
128. See Scott, 606 P.2d at 558.
129. See T. LEBLANG, INFORMED CONSENT A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION 14-20 (1983).
(comprehensive list of statutorily enacted defenses by jurisdiction).
130. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914);
see also Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246 (1980); see gener-
ally KEETON, supra note 2, § 18, at 117.
131. See Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Ala. 1964); Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del.
539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); See generally Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Spe-
cific Diagnosis from Patient Sick with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REv. 349
(1946).
132. See, e.g., Scott, 606 P.2d at 558.
133. Canterbuty v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
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he would have undergone the treatment regardless of the risk
involved.1 3 4
C. Legal Malpractice
1. Background
Historically, the development of legal malpractice traced a
different path than did the development of other types of pro-
fessional liability.1 35 Unlike physicians and other professionals
who were held to the standard of care required of those engaged
in a "public" or "common" calling, lawyers historically insulated
themselves from liability: "Perhaps the most influential factor in
shaping the development of legal malpractice case law is that it
has always been, and will continue to be, written by lawyers."136
This insularity was accomplished by various means - from
calling legal fees "honorariums" or "gratuities" so that clients
could claim no "contract" upon which to sue,137 to imposition of
liability only upon a finding of gross negligence1 31 or breach of
fiduciary duty.1 39 Moreover, this self-imposed protectionism gen-
erated general distrust toward the profession as a whole. 4
Even today, the legislatures and the courts, dominated by
the legal profession, continue to shield lawyers from liability by
failing to recognize fundamental litigation concepts in legal mal-
practice actions. For example, only lawyers have had the temer-
ity to develop an extensive code of professional conduct that
clearly defines and delineates prohibited and unethical conduct,
and then preface that code with the caveat that: "violation of a
134. See Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1970).
135. See supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
136. MALLEN, supra note 2, § 1.2.
137. See generally id. § 3, at 11; Weiland, Another Early Chapter: Attorney Mal-
practice and the Trial Within a Trial: Time for a Change, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 275,
276 n.2 (1986) [hereinafter Weiland].
138. MALLEN, supra note 2, § 1.5, at 16.
139. Id.
140. Id. § 1.2.
If a dishonest attorney should think fit to betray his clients, sell them to their
adversaries, do anything in their cause that is contrary to their interest, pray what
remedy have they? Why, to employ another attorney to call them to account who
will do the very same, ad infinitum.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create
any presumption that a legal duty has been breached .... [The
Rules] are not designed to be a basis for legal liability." 1  This
position infers an attempt not only to prohibit conduct that the
profession views as improper, but also to prevent outsiders from
using lawyers' own standards against them to create civil liabil-
ity. If the legal profession prohibits specific conduct because it is
unethical, and lawyers are required to adhere to such standards,
clients victimized by the violation of such regulations should
have a right to compensation. When an attorney violates a rule
of conduct, it is small solace to the client who has suffered a real
loss to know that the attorney will have his wrist slapped. Inter-
nal regulations are effective to the degree that they discipline
the lawyer who has acted wrongfully, but disciplining the lawyer
does not compensate the injured client. Thus, it is up to the ju-
diciary or legislature, with or without the profession's support,
to permit the use of the profession's own standards to determine
the duty the lawyer owes to a client.
Lawyers are expected to account for their conduct in a man-
ner like all other professionals. 'M Although legal malpractice is
often thought of as attorney negligence, in reality, it is not lim-
ited to liability for negligent conduct. Rather, attorneys can be
held professionally liable for breach of contract"" and breach of
fiduciary obligations as well."' Legal malpractice actions145 are
141. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Scope. A similar provision appears in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. The Model
Code is also referred to as the 1969 Code based on its initial date of adoption by the
ABA House of Delegates. See, e.g., Zanders v. Jones, 680 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
Brown v. Larkin & Shea, P.A., 522 So. 2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
142. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. There is general agreement that
attorneys should be held to the same standards of care as other professionals. KEETON,
supra note 2, § 32, at 185-86; MALLEN, supra note 2, § 1.1, at 4.
143. Breach of contract can be implied or express. An express contract is created
when the attorney promises to achieve specific results or perform a specific service. See,
e.g., Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 181, 491 P.2d 421,
423, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839 (1971). More frequently, there is an implied contract. In every
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer impliedly contracts to use the degree of ordinary
skill and knowledge of a professional. Breach of this duty gives rise to liability. Id.
144. Just as a physician has a fiduciary obligation to his patients, an attorney has a
fiduciary duty to his clients. When he reveals client confidences or represents conflicting
interests, liability for breach of fiduciary duty may be incurred. Breach of a fiduciary
obligation is often considered legal malpractice since it encompasses a breach of the law-
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most frequently based on negligence,'146 breach of contract 147 or
fraud. 148 But where the essential tort is negligence, the plaintiff
must prove duty, breach, proximate cause, and injury. 9
2. Elements of Legal Malpractice
An attorney must act with the level of skill and competence
commonly possessed by members of his profession in good
standing. 150 Thus, an attorney can be held liable for failure to
use that degree of ordinary skill and knowledge expected of any
professional,' 5' provided, of course, that the plaintiff can estab-
lish that the attorney's breach caused his loss.1 52 This is far more
difficult than it appears at first glance, particularly in the litiga-
tion context. To establish proximate cause in a legal malpractice
action, the plaintiff must, in effect, prove two meritorious claims.
This is generally known as the "trial within a trial" require-
ment.15  Not only must the plaintiff prove that the attorney had
a duty, that the attorney breached that duty, and that the plain-
yer's duty to the client. See MALLEN, supra note 2, § 11.1. This is the one area of legal
malpractice where courts have required something analogous to an "informed consent."
See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
145. Although traditional privity requirements no longer always have to be satisfied
to impose liability for professional malpractice, the very nature of the informed consent
theory limits its application to those to whom the professional has a direct, specific, de-
fined duty of care. See, e.g., Vereins Und Westbank, AG v. Carter, 691 F. Supp. 704, 710-
13 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Thus, this Article is limited in scope to a discussion of the applica-
bility of the informed consent theory in the context of the attorney-client relationship.
146. Behnke v. Rodtke, 65 Wis. 2d 403, 222 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1974) (attorney's neg-
ligence "caused" damage to his client).
147. Carroll v. Rountree, 34 N.C. App. 167, 237 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1977), cert. denied,
295 N.C. 549, 248 S.E.2d 725 (1978) (attorney was subject to contract liability for settling
a domestic relations matter without client's authority after the attorney had expressly
promised not to do so without first obtaining his client's consent).
148. MALLEN, supra note 2, § 8.1.
149. See KEETON, supra note 2, § 30, at 164-65.
150. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
151. See KEETON, supra note 2, § 30, at 164-65. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TOaRTS § 299A (1984); Curran, Professional Negligence - Some General Comments, 12
VAND. L. REV. 535, 545 (1959). There is, however, some debate as to whether a lawyer's
conduct should be judged by the standard prevailing in his community, a similar com-
munity or nationally. This issue has not received as much attention in legal malpractice
cases as it has in the medical malpractice area. But the trend is to judge lawyers accord-
ing to a national standard. Id. at 536.
152. See supra notes 18, 106 and accompanying text.
153. See Weiland, supra note 137, at 278.
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tiff suffered a loss, but he also must establish proximate cause.
The plaintiff must show that "but for" the attorney's breach, he
would have been successful in the underlying case on the merits.
This is a difficult burden to say the least.
One commentator suggests that the "'trial within a trial' re-
quirement is a prime example of the failure of [the legal] profes-
sion to police itself."' 15' More precisely, it appears to be an exam-
ple of the legal profession setting standards to "police" itself,
standards that are so incredibly difficult to attain that it in ef-
fect insulates itself from liability.155
As in any other tort-based action, attorneys sued for legal
malpractice may interpose a number of defenses,15 1 including
statutes of limitations,1 57 contributory negligence,15 8 assumption
154. Id.
155. For an excellent discussion of the "trial within a trial" requirement and pro-
posed solutions to the double burden it imposes on plaintiffs, see generally id. But the
"trial within a trial" requirement may not be applicable in an informed consent action.
See infra notes 318 and accompanying text.
156. See generally MALLEN, supra note 2, §§ 17.1-17.18.
157. An extensive discussion of the various statutes of limitations applied in legal
malpractice actions is beyond the scope of this Article. States have various statutes that
might apply to a legal malpractice action depending on the theory of the case, for exam-
ple, fraud, misrepresentation, contract, personal injury, property damage, implied con-
tract or malpractice. Moreover, the commencement and accrual rules vary by jurisdic-
tion. Some jurisdictions apply the Occurrence Rule, where the statute commences to run
upon the occurrence of the critical facts constituting the cause of action. Under this rule,
it is irrelevant when or if the client discovers the critical facts. See MALLEN, supra note
2, § 18.10. Other jurisdictions apply the Damage Rule. Under this approach, the statute
is tolled until the client sustains actual injury. Id. § 18.11. Still other jurisdictions apply
the Continuous Representation Rule. Under this Rule, the cause of action does not ac-
crue until the attorney's representation for the matter at issue has terminated. Id. §
18.12. In addition, nearly all jurisdictions apply some form of the Concealment Rule,
which tolls the statute until the client discovers or should have discovered concealed
facts. But differences exist between jurisdictions on what constitutes concealment. Id. §
18.13. Lastly, some jurisdictions have begun applying the Discovery Rule, that is, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the client knows or should have known
the critical facts constituting the cause of action. Id. § 18.14. For a more extensive dis-
cussion of the applicable statutes of limitations and related issues, see generally id. §§
18.1-18.21.
158. See generally id. § 17.2. Contributory negligence in traditional legal malprac-
tice actions falls within five general categories: (1) where the client fails to supervise,
review or inquire about the issue which is the subject of the representation; (2) where the
client fails to follow the attorney's instructions or advice; (3) where the client actively
interferes with the lawyer's representation or where the client fails to complete specific
responsibilities concerning the claim; (4) where the client fails to provide essential in-
formation to the lawyer; and (5) where the client fails to mitigate the effects of the
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of risk, 159 and waiver, abandonment, and ratification. 10 These
defenses frequently create a legal minefield for the unwary
plaintiff and shield the lawyer from liability. As in the medical
area, the difficulties of proof and availability of these defenses
have not prevented a dramatic increase in malpractice suits.
3. Informed Consent
Generally, the doctrine of informed consent has not been
carried over from medical to legal malpractice. Since lawyers
themselves are primarily responsible for the development of the
law of legal malpractice, it is not surprising that liability con-
cepts in this area have developed agonizingly slowly, have im-
posed almost insurmountable burdens on plaintiffs,' and have
lagged far behind developing liability concepts in other areas of
professional malpractice." 2
Indeed, it is clear that the development of legal malpractice
concepts has lagged far behind those of medical malpractice.16 3
Although both consent 1 " and disclosure"" are important issues
in attorney-client relationships, there are few instances where
attorney's negligence. Id. A question arises as to whether the lawyer can defend because
the client failed to provide specific information about a claim or because the client failed
to review or inquire about certain issues. What about the reverse: should the client be
able to sue when the lawyer neglects to provide that very same information?
159. See generally MALLEN, supra note 2, § 17.11. This defense is particularly ap-
propriate in informed consent actions. See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
160. See generally MALLEN, supra note 2, § 17.11. This defense is also particularly
applicable to informed consent actions. See supra note 134 and infra notes 320-23 and
accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., supra notes 99-105.
162. See KEETON, supra note 2, § 32.
163. The doctrine of informed consent has been recognized in the context of medical
malpractice for more than 30 years. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) (case recognizing duty of informed
consent).
164. For example, an attorney must have consent: to settle a case, e.g., Jones v.
Schreiber, 70 A.D.2d 791, 415 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1979); to waive a jury trial, e.g., Blanton v.
Womancare Clinic, 38 Cal. 3d 396, 696 P.2d 645, 212 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1985); to decide
what plea to enter, e.g., McAleney v. United States, 539 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1976).
165. Disclosure is required, for example, where there are conflicting interests, e.g.,
Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 201 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1984), or where a
settlement offer is made, e.g., Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 94 Mich. App. 419, 288
N.W.2d 443 (1979), aff'd sub. nor. Joos v. Drillock, 127 Mich. App. 98, 338 N.W.2d 736
(1983).
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the courts have read those two requirements in conjunction with
each other and imposed liability on a theory of informed con-
sent.16 One exception to the non-application of informed con-
sent is in the area of fiduciary obligations. Courts have consist-
ently required that where a conflict of interest exists, the
attorney must fully inform the client and obtain from the client
an intelligent consent. 1 7 One court has applied a true "informed
consent" rule in the context of disciplinary proceedings regard-
ing fiduciary responsibilities.' 68 Generally, however, courts nar-
rowly construe the client's right to make an informed choice.
But lawyers' own professional standards of the legal profession
are more than sufficient to support such a right.
D. Professional Obligations
Under a tort theory, the plaintiff can establish a duty on the
part of the defendant by showing the violation of a statute by
the defendant. Since the legislature is presumed to promulgate
laws which are known and obeyed by reasonable men and
women, the violation of a statute which establishes a standard of
conduct can provide a basis for civil liability.6 9 This negligence
per se approach may permit recovery in cases where breach of a
common law duty may be otherwise hard to prove. 70 Different
jurisdictions have developed varying interpretations of the
weight to be given to statutory violations as well as the types of
statutes that can be used.17 '
Considerable controversy has surrounded the question of
whether and when the violation of an ethical rule by an attorney
can provide a basis for liability in a legal malpractice action. Un-
166. See generally MALLEN, supra note 2, § 11.17, at 677.
167. Id.
168. See Figueroa-Olmo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1445, 1451
(D.P.R. 1985).
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1984). See also KEETON, supra
note 2, § 36, at 220. In such a case, the defendant may become liable on the mere basis of
his violation of the statute. No excuse is recognized and neither reasonable ignorance nor
all proper care will avoid liability. Such a statute falls properly under the heading of
strict liability, rather than any basis of negligence.
170. See Keeton, supra note 2, § 36, at 229.
171. Bauer v. H.H. Hall Constr. Co., 140 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 489 N.E.2d 31 (1986);
Zimmer v. Chemung Co. of Performing Arts, 65 N.Y.2d 513, 482 N.E.2d 898, 493
N.Y.S.2d 102 (1985); Bauman v. Crawford, 104 Wash. 2d 241, 704 P.2d 1181, (1985).
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til recently, most jurisdictions held that an ethical violation was
insufficient to establish negligence per se, or even raise a pre-
sumption of negligence.172 At best, the plaintiff could use proof
of a violation to show evidence of negligence. 17s
Whether a violation of the disciplinary code is treated as
evidence or as a presumption of negligence in malpractice ac-
tions against lawyers, 174 it is clear that it can be introduced for
the purpose of establishing a standard of care.' 75 Since the
state's rules for professional conduct have been promulgated by
legal authority, and represent an attempt to affix a standard of
conduct for lawyers, 6 it follows that a lawyer who violates the
code thereby causing injury to a client may be sued by the client
on the basis of that violation.117 Traditionally, courts have ac-
knowledged that the violation of a custom or common practice
in a trade or industry gives rise to a presumption of negligence.
In the context of legal informed consent, the rules dealing with
the attorney's duty to provide information to clients and the cli-
ent's rights to make informed choices establish a standard of
172. ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 301:128 (1984)
[hereinafter LAWYER'S MANUAL]. The ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically disclaims any intention to establish a duty of care owed to clients and others
who may rely on an attorney's professional services. "The disciplinary rules governing
the bar are intended for the protection of the bench and other attorneys, as well as the
public. A breach of a disciplinary rule or other rule of court that is not directly intended
for the benefit of the public doesn't necessarily amount to breach of a duty owed to a
client." Id.
173. Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981). The court held
that violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "as with statutes .... is rebut-
table evidence of malpractice." Id. at 598, 313 N.W.2d at 167.
174. KEETON, supra note 2, § 36, at 227-31.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 172, § 301:128. The authors are reluctant to sug-
gest that courts employ a negligence per se approach in legal informed consent cases
since the disciplinary code may be considered a court rule rather than a statute. In most
states the code is promulgated by the court of highest authority in the jurisdiction. Ar-
guably, court rules should have the force of statutes, although strictly speaking they are
not statutes. The custom of an industry may also give rise to a presumption of negli-
gence. So to the extent that lawyer's conduct involving communications with clients is
customary, it may create a presumption of negligence. Even if courts are unwilling to go
so far as to recognize a presumption in these cases, violation of a disciplinary rule should
at least be admissible as evidence of negligence. See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924
(6th Cir. 1980).
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practice upon which to base an informed consent action. 178 The
question of allocation of authority between attorney and client
has been addressed under various formulations of the ethical
rules. The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics did not spell out a
clear rule for dividing authority between lawyer and client, but
several canons allude to the issue. 7 The 1969 Model Code also
addressed this problem,' ostensibly solving it with a means-
objectives test that stated that the lawyer controlled the means
and the client controlled the objectives in the representation. s18
In practice, however, the rule created a false dichotomy, giving
little guidance to either the practitioner or client. What is an
objective of the litigation? A means? At what point does a
means become an objective? Who should decide? Are some mat-
178. In re Masters, 91 Ill. 2d 413, 438 N.E.2d 187 (1982).
179. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL. ETHICS (1908).
180. MODEL CODE, supra note 141, DR 7-101.
181. Id. EC 7-7, 7-8.
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or
substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make deci-
sions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that
of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions are
binding on his lawyer. As typical examples in civil cases, it is for the client to
decide whether he will accept a settlement offer or whether he will waive his right
to plead an affirmative defense. A defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty
to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to be
desirable and as to the prospects of success on appeal, but it is for the client to
decide what plea should be entered and whether an appeal should be taken.
Id. EC 7.7
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations. A lawyer
ought to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do so. Advice
of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal considerations. A
lawyer should advise his client of the-possible effect of each legal alternative. A
lawyer should bring to bear upon this decision-making process the fullness of his
experience as well as his objective viewpoint. In assisting his client to reach a
proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which
may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible. He may
emphasize the possiblility of harsh consequences that might result from assertion
of legally permissible positions. In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should
always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives
or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for
himself. In the event that the client in a non-adjudicatory matter insists upon a
course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but
not prohibited by Disciplinary Rules, the lawyer may withdraw from the
employment.
Id. E.C. 7.8.
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ters means in some circumstances and objectives in others?182
Even more troubling was the question of how much infor-
mation lawyers must provide their clients in order for the clients
to make decisions concerning the representation. Assuming that
the client has the right to make at least some of the decisions
about his case, how much information is required to make the
decision an informed one? The Canons and the Code did not
address this problem directly. 183 Since there were no clear stan-
dards for lawyers to follow, the failure to inform provided no
basis for an actionable duty.18
The new Model Rules 85 deal directly with the questions of
client decisionmaking and information about the representa-
tion.186 The Rules were adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1983 after three years of study by a select commission
and another three years of spirited debate. 187 Since then the
Rules have been adopted with modifications in thirty jurisdic-
tions, and are being actively considered in nine others.'88 Much
182. See Spiegel, supra note 1, at 65-67.
183. Id. at 49.
184. See MALLEN, supra note 2, § 1.5. The absence of clear standards undoubtedly
had a substantial impact on the attorney-client relationship despite the fact that many
complaints against lawyers were related to inadequate communications, disciplinary
boards were often powerless to impose sanction against lawyers based on a failure to
communicate. In such an environment lawyers have no incentive to improve the quality
of communications with their clients.
185. MODEL RULES, supra note 9. The Model Rules were developed in part because
of concerns that the Model Code failed to provide answers to tough ethical issues faced
by lawyers. The client control issue is a good example of such a failure, but it is not the
only one.
186. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rules 1.2, 11.6.
187. See, e.g., ABA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1987) [herein-
after LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
188. LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 172, § 1:3.
DATES OF ADOPTION OF MODEL RULES
(as amended)
(Alphabetical)
Arizona 2-01-85
Arkansas 1-01-86
Connecticut 10-01-86
Delaware 10-01-85
Florida 1-01-87
Idaho 11-01-86
Indiana 1-01-87
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of the controversy surrounding the Rules deals with issues of
confidentiality, '8 9 pro bono responsibility of lawyers, 190 and ad-
vertising.191 But, the most far-reaching change in the way future
lawyers practice may be related to those provisions of the Rules
defining the attorney-client relationship and establishing the
duty to provide information.192
Model Rule 1.2 provides that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation...
and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they
are to be pursued.1 91 3 The Rule specifically requires the lawyer
to accept the client's decision to settle a case, and in a criminal
case to enter a plea, testify, or waive a jury trial.'94 With respect
to the representation of an accused criminal, the lawyer must
Kansas 3-01-88
Louisiana 1-01-87
Maryland 1-01-87
Michigan 10-01-88
Minnesota 9-01-85
Mississippi 7-01-87
Missouri 1-01-86
Montana 7-01-85
Nevada 3-28-86
New Hampshire 2-01-86
New Jersey 9-10-84
New Mexico 1-01-87
North Carolina 10-07-85
North Dakota 1-01-88
Oklahoma 7-01-88
Pennsylvania 4-01-88
South Dakota .7-01-88
Utah 1-01-88
Washington 9-01-85
West Virginia 1-01-89
Wisconsin 1-01-88
Wyoming 1-12-87
189. See Spiegel, supra note 1.
190. See generally ABA COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE: IMPLEMENTING
THE LAWYER'S PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE OBLIGATIONS (1977); Christensen, The Lawyer's
Pro Bono Public Responsibility, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 (1981).
191. See Elliot, Trolling for Clients Under the First Amendment: It's Hard to Keep
a Good Solicitor Down, 60 CONN. B.J. 214 (1986); Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertis-
ing and Solicitation Rules Under Commercial Speed and Anti-trust Doctrine, 13 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1986).
192. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rules 1.2, 1.4.
193. Id. Rule 1.2.
194. Id. Rule 1.2(a).
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consult with the client concerning those matters about which the
client has the right to decide.195 Additionally, the lawyer may
limit the objectives of the representation (if the client consents
after consultation).1 96 The Rule also forbids the lawyer from
counseling a client or assisting in criminal or fraudulent conduct,
and adds that when the lawyer knows that the client expects
such assistance "the lawyer shall consult with the client concern-
ing the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct.' 97
Model Rule 1.4 reinforces the requirement to provide infor-
mation articulated in Rule 1.2. Rule 1.4 mandates that the law-
yer must do three things: "keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter,"' 98 "promptly comply with reason-
able requests for information,' ' 199 and "explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make in-
formed decisions .... Since Rule 1.4 has no direct counter-
part in the Code,20' there is little historical guidance to help in-
terpret the Rule. The Comments to Rule 1.4 make clear that it
pertains to the matters covered in Rule 1.2(a), 2  and the two
195. Id.
196. Id. at Rule 1.2(c).
197. Id. at Rules 1.2(d), (e).
198. Id. at Rule 1.4(a).
199. Id.
200. Id. at Rule 1.4(b).
201. See MODEL CODE, supra note 141, EC 7-8, EC 9-2.
202. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.4.
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to per-
mit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
COMMENT:
(1] The client should have sufficient information to particiate intelligently in
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which
they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. For
example, a lawyer negotiating on behalf of a client should provide the client with
facts relevant to the matter, inform the client of communications from another
party and take other reasonable steps that permit the client to make a decision
regarding a serious offer from another party. A lawyer who receives from opposing
counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a
criminal case should promptly inform the client of its substance unless prior dis-
cussions with the client have left it clear that the proposal will be unacceptable.
See Rule 1.2(a). Even when a client delegates authority to the lawyer, the client
should be kept advised of the status of the matter.
Id. at rule 1.4.
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Rules together establish an unequivocal duty to inform the cli-
ent about fundamental aspects of the representation.
The term "consult" which appears so prominently in Rule
1.2 is similar to the informational provisions of Rule 1.4.203 Con-
sult is defined in the Preamble of the Model Rules as "commu-
nication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client
to appreciate the significance of the matter in question." The
framers of the Model Rules chose the word "consult" over "dis-
close" which is used throughout the Model Code. The definition
of consultation incorporates the concepts of participatory com-
munication and comprehension, while disclose suggests a more
one-directional statement of information that does not connote
understanding.2 4 The choice of the term consultation seems to
place a greater burden on the lawyer to provide adequate infor-
mation for the client to make informed decisions." 5
In addition to the provisions of Rule 1.2, the Rules require
informed consent in a number of situations. The client must
consent after consultation before the lawyer may reveal informa-
tion relating to the representation. 0 6 A lawyer may not re-
present a client if the client's interests are materially adverse to
those of the lawyer,0 7 or if the representation may be materially
limited by other interests.20 Nor may the lawyer enter into a
business transaction with a client,20 9 or use information about
203. While Rule 1.4 talks about providing information to the client in situations
where the client has the power to make or participate in decisions, the Preamble defini-
tion of "consult" seems to refer to two-way communication and is linked in the Rules to
client consent to specific actions taken by the attorney. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9,
Terminology.
204. Disclose is defined as: "1. to uncover; to lay open to view. 2. to reveal, to make
known..." while consult is defined as "1. to seek the opinion or advice of another; to
confer or converse in order to plan or decide something." and "2. to ask advice of; to
seek the opinion of as a guide to one's own judgment.. ." Clearly these words are not
synonyms. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED (1983) [em-
phasis added].
205. While the Rules consistently substitute consult for disclose, Model Rule 1.6
suggests that the change was not an accident. In fact, the earliest version of the proposed
Model Rules used the term disclose. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 187, at 48-55.
206. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.6(a).
207. Id. at Rule 1.7(a).
208. Id. at Rule 1.7(b). Here, the rule specifies that in situations involving the repre-
sentation of multiple clients "the consultation shall include explanation of the implica-
tions of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved." Id.
209. Id. at Rule 1.8(a).
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the representation to the disadvantage of the client.2 1 The cli-
ent must consent to the lawyer's acceptance of compensation for
the representation from a third party.2 ' The clients in a multi-
ple representation must consent to an aggregate settlement of
claims. 2 ' A lawyer may not (1) represent a client in a case in
which the lawyer is related to the opposing attorney without the
client's consent,"'3 (2) represent someone against a former client
in a substantially related matter,21' (3) represent a private client
against a government agency if the lawyer was formerly involved
personally and substantially with the agency," 5 or (4) represent
anyone in a matter in which the lawyer was involved in the case
as a judge, law clerk, or arbitrator.21 6 It is equally impermissible
for a lawyer to act as an intermediary among clients without
their consent.217 A common thread in these situations is that
they involve conflicts between the clients' interests and what the
lawyer wants to do. When the lawyer wants to pursue a course of
action that contravenes a client's interests, the Rules specify
that the client controls the right to make an informed decision.
In other situations, this is not the case.21 '
The notion of client consent is not new to the Rules. Most
of the situations described above also required consent under
the Code,2"9 but since the Code used the expression "after full
disclosure" rather than "after consultation," the requirement for
informed consent as articulated in the Code is highly ambigu-
ous. 220 The Rules adopt a client-centered approach to the law-
yer-client relationship that gives the client greater power than
210. Id. at Rule 1.8(b).
211. Id. at Rule 1.8(f).
212. Id. at Rule 1.8(g).
213. Id. at Rule 1.8(i).
214. Id. at Rule 1.9(a).
215. Id. at Rule 1.11(a).
216. Id. at Rule 1.12(a).
217. Id. at Rule 2.2(a). Rule 2.2(b) adds that "[wihile acting as intermediary, the
lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decisions to be made and the consid-
erations relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately informed
decisions" Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in this instance at least, the Rules link the con-
sultation language to the concept of informed consent.
218. See, e.g., id. at Rule 1.5(e)(2), which provides that "the client is advised of and
does not object to..." a division of fees among lawyers.
219. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 141, DR 4-101 (client confidences).
220. Id. DR 4-101(B)(3), (C)(1).
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suggested by the Code.221 Part of the change may be related to
the drafting. The Rules are drafted with greater specificity and
employ mandatory language to spell out the various communica-
tion requirements.2 22 Thus, the increased clarity of the Rules
makes it easier to establish a duty based upon the new informed
consent language.
Whether disciplinary standards may be used to provide a
basis for establishing attorney negligence is another matter. Tra-
ditionally, courts were reluctant to impose a duty upon lawyers
that could provide a basis for civil liability on the theory that
the disciplinary process was the best vehicle to deal with attor-
ney misconduct.22 s This view, spelled out in the Preamble to the
Rules,224 has been subject to both criticism226 and erosion.226
However, if it is ambiguous or unclear whether the ethical rule
delineates a standard of conduct, courts may be unwilling to
adopt it as a standard.227
III. Informed Consent and Legal Malpractice
A. Legal Background
An informed consent cause of action in legal malpractice
has been suggested by some commentators, but courts have been
slow to respond to these calls to action.228 Part of the reason is
undoubtedly the inertia of precedent; since courts have not ex-
tended the cause of action based on failure to obtain informed
consent available in medical malpractice to lawyers in the past,
221. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.2(a). The client is to be considered the
master of the objectives of representation.
222. Id. Rule 1.4 states: "(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. (b)
A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation." Id. (emphasis added).
223. See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
224. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Scope, §§ 5, 6.
225. MALLEN, supra note 2, § 1.9, at 31-33.
226. M. DAVIS & F. ELLISTON, ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 14 (1986).
227. See, e.g., Tyree v. Hendrix, 480 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1985). In a legal malpractice
action the court held that failure to inform defendant of enhancement statute which
could double sentence imposed upon him could not support legal malpractice claim. Id.
at 1177.
228. See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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they are unwilling to do so today.22 9 Because medical informed
consent has its roots in battery, the argument that legal in-
formed consent cannot rely on that theory has superficial force.
However, as informed consent has evolved in the medical area,
reliance on battery theory has evaporated. 30 Presently, the ac-
tion is based upon the patient's right to make decisions about
his or her body and the doctor's duty to provide enough infor-
mation to allow an informed choice." 1 The doctor's duty flows
directly from the patient's right.
There is no concomitant right of lawyers' clients to control
the flow of information that corresponds to patients' rights to
control their bodies.132 Creation of a broad-based right to sue
based on an ill-defined right to autonomy is neither desirable
nor practical in the legal setting. Taken to its logical limit, the
client retains the right to make all decisions about the represen-
tation. In such an environment, whenever a client disagreed with
the lawyer, the client could claim that consent to the lawyer's
conduct was missing or invalid because of inadequate informa-
tion. Such an environment would foster an adversarial atmo-
sphere and impede open communication instead of improving
attorney-client relationships.
Ultimately, the question is not whether client control of the
representation is "good," but whether it is proper. The client
controls certain decisions; the lawyer controls others; some re-
quire joint decisionmaking. The Model Rules attempt to deline-
ate specific circumstances where the power to make decisions is
229. See Martyn, supra note 1, at 321-40.
230. KEETON, supra note 2, § 32. See also Trogrun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569,
207 N.W.2d 297 (1973). If treatment is completely unauthorized and performed without
any consent at all, there has been a battery. However, if a physician obtains a patient's
consent but has breached his duty to inform, the patient has a cause of action sounding
in negligence.
231. See, e.g., Nickell v. Gonzalez, 17 Ohio St. 3d 136, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (1985) (phy-
sician required to disclose whatever information a reasonably prudent patient would
deem material in deciding whether to undergo a medical procedure).
232. On one level, there is probably a different emotional response to losing the use
of one's arm than losing one's house. Medical procedures produce irreversible results
which impact fundamentally upon an individual's opportunities. Losses occasioned by a
lawyer's advice may be just as disastrous, but the societal value placed upon such a loss
is different. Just as deadly force may be used in self-defense, where it is not permitted in
defense of property, legal injuries may not require the same degree of protection as phys-
ical injuries.
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granted to attorney, client, or both." "
The drafters of the Model Rules attempted to promulgate
rules that would be internally consistent and supported by ex-
ternal legal doctrine enunciated in the case law and general
agency principles. 134 While there is considerable case law estab-
lishing that agency principles govern the attorney's exercise of
authority on behalf of the client,23 5 the Model Code did not rec-
ognize any nexus between its provisions and those of agency law.
By recognizing the applicability of an underlying body of legal
doctrine, the Rules extend the duties of lawyer and client be-
yond the disciplinary process.
Agency is defined as "the fiduciary relation which results
from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act.' 32 An agency relationship does
not require a contract, only an agreement.3 7 When an individual
agrees to be represented by the lawyer, an agency arises. The
client is the principal, the person who has authorized the lawyer
to act on his behalf and under his control. The lawyer is the
agent, who is authorized to act on behalf of the client. "' The
agent's authority may be implied or inferred from the principal's
statements and conduct, as well as from the facts of the situa-
tion itself.'3 ' "If [the agent] is a professional, he represents that
he has the knowledge which is standard for the profession in
233. See infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
234. G. HAZARD, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 10 (1985); Spiegel, supra note 1; Peck, supra note 1.
235. Brinkley v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir.
1973).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1)(1958).
237. Id.
238. Id. at § 385(1). This section states in part that "an agent is subject to a duty to
obey all reasonable directions in regard to the manner of performing a service that he
has contracted to perform." Id.
239. Id. at § 385(1) comment a. This comment states in part:
[A] contract of agency is interpreted as including a promise by the agent to act
with reference to the subject matter of the agency in accordance with the reasona-
ble directions of the principal.... [I]n the absence of a special agreement... an
attorney is in complete charge of the minutiae of court proceedings and can prop-
erly withdraw from the case, subject to control by the court, if he is not permitted
to act as he thinks best.
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which he is employed .... ",240 The agent is a fiduciary, "having a
duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit
of another in matters connected with his undertaking. ' 24' The
principal, on the other hand, "has the right to control the con-
duct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him.
242
All these rules define the attorney-client relationship and sup-
port the allocation of power established in Rule 1.2.
Rule 1.4 is consistent with the agent's duty to provide
information:
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use rea-
sonable efforts to give his principal information which is relevant
to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the
principal would desire to have communicated without violating a
superior duty to a third person. "243
"The duty is inferred, just as an authority may be inferred. The
extent of the duty depends on the kind of work entrusted to
him, his previous relations with the principal, and all the facts of
the situation. "244
Since the Model Rules are supported by principles of gen-
eral law, the lawyer's duty to inform should not be different in
the disciplinary setting than in the professional liability setting.
Not only can the body of disciplinary cases and ethics opinions
provide insights as to the proper interpretation of the rule, but
the presence of the rule in code form, promulgated by the high-
est court in the jurisdiction, permits the trial court in a civil case
to look to the disciplinary standard in establishing the profes-
sional standard in a professional liability case.245
If agency principles are recognized as applicable to profes-
sional liability situations generally, some of the distinctions be-
tween medical informed consent and the legal counterpart evap-
orate. If the mutual responsibilities in the professional
240. Id. at § 10 comment c.
241. Id. at § 13 comment a.
242. Id. at § 14.
243. Id. at § 381. The comment indicates that the duty to inform may exist even if
the principal has not specifically instructed the agent to do so, "if he has notice of facts
which, in view of his relations with the principal, he should know may affect the desires
of the principal as to his own conduct .... Id. at § 381 comment a.
244. Id.
245. In re Masters, 91 Ill. 2d 413, 438 N.E.2d. 187 (1982).
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relationship are defined in agency terms, it may be easier to
achieve a unified theory of professional liability.2"
Instead of focusing on historical anomalies such as the fact
that medical informed consent grew out of battery, it is easier
and more logical to recognize that both the doctor and the law-
yer have a common law duty to provide information and to ob-
tain informed consent in the exercise of their responsibilities as
agents for their clients or patients.2 47
Viewed in agency terms, the lawyer's duty to inform the cli-
ent is inherent in the lawyer-client relationship. The client, as
principal in the relationship, may direct the lawyer's actions
with respect to those matters for which the client asked the law-
yer to act on his or her behalf. However, if such a right is to
have meaning, the lawyer also must have a duty to provide ade-
quate information to allow the client to make informed deci-
sions. On the other hand, the client/principal does not have un-
limited control of the situation. The underlying basis for agency
law is the precept that the agent is entrusted or given power to
act on behalf of and to bind the principal. By creating the
agency, the client cedes certain power to the agent to act on his
or her behalf.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct attempt to spell
out the delineation of power in this agency relationship in con-
siderable detail.2 48 It is clear that the drafters of the Rules did
not choose to break from established agency principles and give
the client control over all aspects of the representation. They
established specific situations in which the client controls the at-
torney's conduct, and reserved for the attorney the power to ex-
ercise professional judgment in carrying out the responsibilities
246. Although this is not the topic of this Article, such an approach would seem to
make more sense than treating doctors, lawyers, accountants, brokers and other profes-
sionals differently in similar circumstances. While differences in the types of services
performed, the nature of the professional relationship itself, and the applicable codes of
conduct may produce different results, there may be situations where common rules are
appropriate. One of these seems to be the duty to inform; the agent must provide enough
information to permit the principal to make decisions about matters over which the prin-
cipal has control.
247. The other side of the coin is that the doctor-patient relationship is an agency,
also.
248. See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rules 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8.
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entrusted to him. 49
The Rules correctly recognize that both attorney and client
have a role in decisionmaking, and that sometimes these roles
overlap. Sometimes decisions must be joint ones; sometimes
there is conflict as to who should decide. The nexus between at-
torney and client in these situations is information; hence, the
attorney's duty to provide information is crucial to this dynamic
process.
It is not the purpose of this Article to suggest ultimate an-
swers to these questions. Rather, the authors suggest that the
Model Rules provide a flexible formula for allocating the deci-
sionmaking power. They establish the basic concept of client
control of the objectives of the representation. They specify cer-
tain situations where decisionmaking is reserved for the client.2"
They provide that the attorney has the right to exercise inde-
pendent professional judgment about the means by which cli-
ents' objectives should be pursued.2 51 They require at every
stage of the representation that the lawyer keep the client in-
formed about the case.2 52 They presume that when the lines of
communication are open, lawyers and clients will be able to re-
solve issues involving the allocation of power, and through inter-
pretation of the Rules over time, aspects of this allocation will
be clarified and evolve.2 53
If the Rules were drafted so as to establish standards of
conduct, why did the drafters include in the preamble the state-
ment that they should not be used to establish civil liability?
The most obvious answer is that lawyers were interested in pro-
tecting themselves, and, recognizing the potential for application
of the Rules in civil suits, attempted to insulate themselves from
liability. Earlier drafts of the Rules provided that violation of
the Rules "should not necessarily result in civil liability, 2 54 rec-
249. See infra notes 263-303 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 9. Rule 1.2 requires a lawyer to "abide by a
client's decision concerning the objectives of representation ...." Id. at Rule 1.2.
251. ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 25 (1984).
252. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.4. See also MALLEN, Recognizing and De-
fining Legal Malpractice, 30 S.C.L. REV. 203, 209 (1979).
253. See generally Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-
Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dia-
logue, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1003 (1980).
254. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft)(1980).
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ognizing implicitly that in some cases violation of the Rules may
do just that. Under both the Code and the Rules, cases increas-
ingly recognize that where the ethical rules establish a standard
of conduct, violation of the rules may point in the direction of
negligence. 55 Courts are not likely to be persuaded to abandon
such codes despite the self-serving protestations of the lawyers
themselves. 6
A more charitable interpretation of the Preamble language
would suggest that the drafters were attempting to avoid letting
the Rules become mere weapons in the courtroom battle.257 In
any event, whether the Model Rules represent a self-serving at-
tempt to insulate lawyers from malpractice liability, or consti-
tute a public spirited gesture, a unilateral pronouncement in the
Preamble of the document is not likely to deter either plaintiffs
or the courts from adopting an otherwise appropriate stand-
ard.25 8
If courts are willing to utilize the Model Rules to establish
an informed consent standard in legal malpractice cases, the
Rules themselves define the limits of the lawyer's duty. 59 Look-
ing at specific Rules, there are three broad areas where the duty
to inform comes into play: in litigation,2 60 in situations where the
lawyer is not acting as an advocate,261 and in cases involving cli-
ent objectives.262
Under the Rules, a lawyer acting as an advocate must pro-
vide information to his client in situations where the right to
make decisions is reserved to the client. s63 Although it could be
argued that the lawyer should keep the client informed about all
matters relating to the representation, it does not follow that a
lawyer who does not do so should be subject to civil liability in
all situations. By limiting application of the duty to inform to
those matters articulated in the Rules, the limits of a new theory
255. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
256. Id.
257. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Preamble.
258. Id.
259. See generally Peck, supra note 1, at 1290-93; Spiegel, supra note 1, 71-72.
260. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 9, at Rules 1.2, 1.7.
261. See, e.g., id. at Rules 1.8, 2.2, 2.3.
262. See, e.g., id. at Rule 1.2 (including comments).
263. Id.
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of recovery in legal malpractice can be allowed to evolve. In ad-
dition, attorneys subject to the Rules are on notice as to their
provisions, and cannot claim that they were unaware of a duty
to inform where that duty is spelled out. In the absence of clear
language, it is difficult to envision the duty giving rise to civil
liability.
In the litigation setting, the Rules addressing civil and crim-
inal responsibilities should be discussed separately. However, in
each case, if the client has the right to make a particular deci-
sion, the lawyer has a concomitant' duty to provide adequate in-
formation to permit the decision to be an informed one.
In civil litigation, the client has the right to decide whether
to accept a settlement offer.2 ' If the lawyer accepts an offer
without authorization, or fails to communicate an offer to the
client, the lawyer may be subject to liability.26 5 In settlement sit-
uations, the client must demonstrate that the attorney acted un-
reasonably. 6 The right of the client to approve a settlement
and to sue the lawyer for unauthorized settlement is already well
established. 7 Such a right is consistent with a broader action
based upon a theory of informed consent.268 Stated simply, an
informed consent action covers unauthorized settlement as well
as other analogous situations in which the Rules require the law-
yer to obtain the client's informed consent. Thus, recognition of
an informed consent action is a logical step for courts that ac-
cept an action based on unauthorized settlement.
The other area in civil litigation where the client is given
the right to decide under both the law and the Rules involves
264. Id. at Rule 1.2. See, e.g., in re Montrey, 511 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1974) (attorney
settled case for an amount in excess of authority).
265. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.2. See also In re Stern, 81 N.J. 297, 406
A.2d 970 (1979) (attorney subject to disbarment for misrepresenting to client that suit
was filed when it was not and for secretly accepting a settlement offer despite client's
refusal). Silver v. State Bar, 13 Cal. 3d 134, 528 P.2d 1157, 117 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1974)
(attorney dismissed client's appeal without his client's consent).
266. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
267. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.2 (a). An attorney has a duty to disclose to
the client all good faith settlement offers. See, e.g., In re Ratzel, 108 Wis. 2d 447, 449,
321 N.W.2d 543, 544 (1982); Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 94 Mich. App. 419, 424, 288
N.W.2d 443, 445 (1979), aff'd, Joos v. Drillock, 127 Mich. App. 99, 338 N.W.2d 736
(1983).
268. Joos, 94 Mich. App. at 424, 288 N.W.2d at 445.
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conflicts of interest.269 The Rules identify several circumstances
where the client must consent to the conflict or the attorney
must withdraw from the representation.2 70 As Part II of this Ar-
ticle demonstrates, the informational component of the term
"consultation" is identical to that of Rule 1.4.71 Thus, the law-
yer has a duty to provide adequate information to the client in
order to assure an informed consent to a potential conflict.
In the criminal area, the Rules2" are quite specific: the cli-
ent must decide what plea to enter,2" whether to testify in his
own defense,2 74 and whether to waive a jury trial.275 These rights
enunciated in the Model Rules derive from the constitutional
rights protecting individuals accused of crimes.76 In these cases
the lawyer must consult with the defendant concerning the im-
plications of decisions involving these rights. 17 While the failure
of the attorney to provide this information may give rise to a
collateral attack on a subsequent conviction based on a theory of
ineffective assistance of counsel, 78 a duty to obtain the client's
informed consent would also permit a direct action against the
attorney.2 79 Although an overturned conviction might negate the
civil suit by eliminating the damages in some cases, 80 in others
there may be special damages resulting from the failure to in-
269. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 111.
270. See, e.g., id. at Rule 1.7(b) which states that a lawyer may not represent two
clients with conflicting interests unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representa-
tion of that client will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and (2)
each client consents after consultation. Id.
271. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
272. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.2(a) states in part "[i]n a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea
to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify." Id.
273. See, e.g., McAleney v. United States, 539 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1976) (court held
that attorneys have a duty during plea bargaining to ensure that any information con-
veyed to clients is accurate and complete).
274. Wisconsin v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, 133, 291 N.W.2d 487, 492 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 957 (1980).
275. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1942).
276. ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT 24-25 (1984).
277. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.2(a).
278. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812-36 (1975) (decision to waive
counsel); Adams, 317 U.S. at 274-75 (decision to demand jury trial).
279. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., State v. Ermert, 94 Wash. 2d 839, 621 P.2d 121 (1980).
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form.28 Thus, in a criminal case there may be a distinction be-
tween a failure to provide advice and actually offering bad
advice.
Another set of circumstances where the Rules have estab-
lished the right of the client to consent to representation arises
in a non-advocate setting.282 The Rules, unlike the Code, recog-
nize that lawyers perform a number of different functions be-
sides representing clients as advocates.283 The lawyer's responsi-
bility, however, does not evaporate if the representation does not
involve the adversary process.
The most notable non-advocate role for the lawyer is that of
mediator. Rule 2.2 states that "[a] lawyer may act as an inter-
mediary between clients if: (1) the lawyer consults with each cli-
ent concerning the implications of the common representation,
including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on
the attorney-client privilege, and obtains each client's consent to
the common representation .... This provision recognizes
the inherent problems involved in common representation,8 6
and makes clear that the lawyer cannot assume such an interme-
diary role without the client's informed consent. The Rule goes
on to provide that the lawyer must independently consider the
client's need for information. The representation is only permis-
sible if "the lawyer reasonably believes ... that each client will
be able to make adequately informed decisions ....
This Rule establishes an objective standard for determining
whether the lawyer's judgment is appropriate, and a protection
against those situations where the clients may not appreciate the
dangers or may not be in a position to make a reasonably in-
formed choice.2 87 A lawyer who acts as an intermediary must
continue to communicate with her clients while she performs
that role; she must "consult with each client concerning the de-
281. See Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis. 2d 173, 182-85, 286 N.W.2d 573, 577-78 (1980).
282. See, e.g., MODEL RUiLs, supra note 9, Rules 1.8, 2.2.
283. See LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 172, § 51:103.
284. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 2.2(a)(1).
285. There is a difference between a lawyer who acts as a mediator (Rule 2.2) and a
lawyer who serves as an advocate for multiple parties (Rules 1.7, 1.8(g)), although both
situations require client consent after consultation.
286. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 2 .2(a)(2).
287. Id. at Rule 2.2.
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cisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making
them, so that each client can make adequately informed deci-
sions.'28 Thus, the lawyer must do more than secure informed
consent to the arrangement; she must continue to inform the cli-
ents about all matters involving the representation.
The comments to Rule 2.2 specify that "[p]aragraph (b) is
an application of the principle expressed in Rule 1.4. Where the
lawyer is an intermediary, the clients ordinarily must assume
greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is inde-
pendently represented." '' When the lawyer represents the cli-
ent as an advocate, the lawyer acts exclusively for the client.
When a lawyer represents a single client, that client may cede
greater decisionmaking power to the lawyer than when the law-
yer represents more than one client in the same matter or when
he acts as an intermediary. Since the client does not rely on the
non-advocate lawyer as a personal representative, the client
alone must make the decisions. In order for the client to do so in
a meaningful way, the lawyer must provide adequate informa-
tion. If the lawyer breaches this duty, the client may sue under a
failure to inform theory.
Rule 2.3 discusses the lawyer's evaluation of a matter in-
volving a client that will be used by a third party. 90 In this situ-
ation, also, the client must consent to the arrangement after
consultation.291 The duty does not extend as far in the evaluator
situation as it does in the mediator one. In the latter circum-
stance, the duty goes only to the consent to the arrangement,
largely because ongoing communication with the client is not as
critical to the evaluation as the accurate assessment for the ben-
efit of the third party.29 2 Clearly, however, the attorney cannot
undertake such an evaluation absent the informed consent of
the client without risking liability.2 93
288. Id. at Rule 2.2(b).
289. Id. at Rule 2.2, comment 9.
290. See also LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 172, § 71:701.
291. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 2.3.
292. See, e.g., Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1080 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968), 434 U.S. 1035 (1978);
Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co., 300 F.2d 813, 814 (5th Cir. 1962).
293. In one sense, this duty is the same as the duty enunciated in Rule 1.6 stating
that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
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The last set of situations where the Model Rules establish a
duty to inform falls under the rubric of client control over the
objectives of the representation.29 Any situation in the repre-
sentation which constitutes an objective is subject to the client's
decision, and implicates the duty to inform prescribed in Rule
1.4.295 The problem with this statement of the Rule lies in the
difficulty of distinguishing between objectives controlled by the
client, and means, sometimes referred to as strategy and tactics,
reserved to the lawyer. It is not the position of this Article that
anything in the representation becomes an objective because the
client says so, or that the means-objective dichotomy should be
abandoned in favor of complete client control of decisions. Such
a stance is supported by neither the case law296 nor the Rules. 297
It is clear, however, that the present language provides little
guidance in determining who should decide particular questions.
One solution to this dilemma is to create a materiality stan-
dard: a matter is an objective if a reasonable person of ordinary
prudence would attach such weight to it that he would want to
reserve the decision to himself.28 A subjective standard would
focus on the actual client's opinion as to whether or not a matter
constitutes an "objective." Such a standard fails to protect the
lawyer from the tyranny of clients who would cry foul under an
informed consent theory whenever they disagreed with the law-
yer's course of conduct. 299
authorized in order to carry out the representation." MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule
1.6 (emphasis added). The duty of the lawyer regarding information about the represen-
tation is the same in the advocate and evaluator situation. The scope of confidentiality is
much broader under the Rules than under the Code, where DR 4-101(A) prohibits dis-
closure of confidences ("information protected by the attorney-client privilege") and
secrets ("information gained in the professional relationship that the client has re-
quested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be
likely to be detrimental to the client"). MODEL CODE, supra note 140. Under the broader
language of the Rules, it is conceivable that a client could sue the lawyer for disclosing
any "information relating to the representation," despite consent, if the consent was not
an informed one. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.6.
294. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.2.
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Turner, 256 F. Supp. 670, 677-79 (D. Utah 1966), aff'd, 386
F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1967).
297. See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rules 1.2, 2.2.
298. LAwYER's MANUAL, supra note 172, §§ 31:301-10.
299. Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1980).
The fact ... that the attorney in the heat of the trial disregards the direction
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In his handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, Professor Hazard points out that:
adequate communication is in fact one of the essential building
blocks of the client-lawyer relationship. The relationship is at
bottom a matter of simple agency: a client engages a lawyer to do
a job. Of necessity, therefore, a lawyer must get his instructions
from the client, report back on his progress, and seek guidance as
new options become available. 00
The fact that the client directs the fundamental agency
does not mean that the lawyer does not have certain inherent
and implied authority.3 01 If the client has communicated to third
parties the apparent authority of the attorney, the attorney can
bind the client.3 0 2 Further, matters falling within the scope of
the lawyer's professional expertise should not be left to the cli-
ent.303 In matters of material importance to the client, however,
the lawyer must provide adequate information to allow the cli-
ent to make an informed decision.
In all the instances enumerated in this section, the Model
Rules establish an explicit duty on the part of the lawyer to pro-
vide information sufficient to permit the client's informed con-
sent. The fact that self-regulating lawyers disclaim any civil lia-
bility for breach of this duty"0 4 should not bar courts from
adopting the Rules as a standard of conduct if the language of
the Rules actually articulates such a standard, which it does. By
limiting the applicability of the duty to inform to situations spe-
cifically designated in the Rules, the cause of action is both
manageable and predictable. Finally, by recognizing a duty to
inform, courts can bring the law of legal malpractice into har-
mony with professional liability law in other professions, such as
medicine.
of the client as to trial strategy or activity does not give the client a right of action
against the attorney.... If the client had the last word on this, the client could be
his or her own lawyer.
Id. at 1256-57.
300. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYFRING: A HANDBOOK OF THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 62 (1985).
301. LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 172, § 31:304.
302. Jones v. Nunley, 274 Or. 591, 595, 547 P.2d 616, 618 (1976).
303. LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 172, § 31:310.
304. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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In an action based upon a lawyer's failure to provide infor-
mation, the plaintiff must prove breach of the duty. If the duty
itself is defined in terms of the lawyer's obligation to provide
adequate information to allow the client to make an informed
decision about the case, breach should be defined as a failure to
disclose the facts necessary to make such a decision in such a
way that the client understands the risks and advantages of the
options available to him. The plaintiff may show that the attor-
ney failed to disclose that which he should have disclosed, or
that the disclosure was insufficient to allow the client to make a
reasoned choice. Thus, the attorney may neglect to describe a
relevant course of action, withhold information about courses
not favored by the attorney, misrepresent the situation to the
client, or communicate so imprecisely that the client fails to
comprehend the substance of the communication. 0 5 In addition,
the lawyer may fail to provide the disclosure in a manner timely
enough to permit the client to act.30 6 The key to understanding
the requirements for breach of the duty may be found in the
language of Rule 1.4 and the definition of consultation in the
Model Rules.8 7 The clear import of these provisions is that the
specific requirements of disclosure may vary from case to case
depending on the circumstances, but in every case the client
must understand enough to make a reasonably informed
decision.30 8
The other problem in proving breach is one that has
plagued the medical cases involving informed consent: what
standard of disclosure should be applied? While the subjective
standard permits recovery in a greater number of cases and is
arguably more consistent with the underlying theory of informed
consent, many courts have applied an objective standard of dis-
closure. Such a standard asks what disclosures the reasonable
patient similarly situated would need in order to make an in-
formed decision.309 It strikes a balance between the interests of
305. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1.4(b).
306. Id. at Rule 1.3.
307. Id. at Terminology [2] states: "'Consult' or 'Consultation' denotes communica-
tion of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the signifi-
cance of the matter in question." Id.
308. Id. at Rule 1.4 comment 1.
309. Nickell v. Gonzalez, 17 Ohio St. 3d 136, 138, 477 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (1985).
[Vol. 9:391
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss3/2
DUTY TO KEEP CLIENTS INFORMED
doctor and patient, and, for this reason, has gained increasing
acceptance."' 0
In legal informed consent cases as well, an objective stan-
dard seems more practical, manageable, and consistent with the
trend in the medical malpractice area.311 The lawyer's client
would have to show that the lawyer breached his duty by failing
to provide that information which a reasonable client of ordi-
nary prudence would require.
Causation has proved to be problematic in the medical in-
formed consent cases also.312 The issue is whether to apply an
objective or subjective standard. The same question would arise
in a legal informed consent case. In order for causation to exist,
the doctor's failure to provide information must be a substantial
factor in bringing about the patient's injury. A subjective stan-
dard would look to the patient's personal belief that the doctor
failed to provide sufficient information. An objective standard
would ask whether a reasonable patient of ordinary prudence
would have consented to the doctor's conduct had the doctor
disclosed the risk. In a medical case, the patient may be dissatis-
fied with the results of a surgical procedure.31 3 Under a subjec-
tive standard, the patient's belief that the doctor failed to pro-
vide sufficient information as to the risks involved would be
sufficient to support causation if the risk in question material-
ized. Under an objective standard, causation would be deter-
mined by a reasonable patient standard.
In legal informed consent the same issue exists: is an objec-
tive or subjective standard more appropriate? What happens if
the client claims that his lawyer failed to inform him of the risk
of losing at trial if a settlement offer is refused, and the case is
in fact lost? Using a subjective standard for causation, the attor-
ney is at the mercy of the client who claims that he did not un-
derstand the risk. Such a standard would give the losing client
two bites at the apple: the original case, and the malpractice suit
310. KEETON, supra note 2, § 32.
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., East v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 682, 686 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Nothing
in the record reflected that the plaintiff would have forgone his surgical implantation of
a penile prosthesis had he been informed by the physician that circumcision was neces-
sary. Id.
313. Id. at 685.
1989]
53
PACE LAW REVIEW
against the lawyer. An objective standard would consider
whether the information received about the risk of loss at trial
was sufficient to permit a reasonable client to make an informed
decision to settle. This standard is the better rule because it bal-
ances the interests of lawyers and clients. Whether an objective
or subjective standard is applied, there must be a causal nexus
between the lawyer's breach of duty and the client's loss.3 14
Specifically, the lawyer should disclose the alternative and
recommended courses of action, legal and non-legal risks of the
alternative choices, the likelihood of success of each option, and
the general value of the case. 1 6 The lawyer must present to the
client an understandable description of the alternatives and the
consequences of each choice."' 6 While there can be no bright-line
test of sufficiency for the information provided, the lawyer
should always attempt to provide enough information to permit
informed consent by a reasonable client.
The client must of course suffer some injury in order to re-
cover. However, it has long been recognized that a choice of ac-
tion is a property right and such a right has value.3 17 Thus, the
loss of a cause of action through the attorney's failure to obtain
an informed consent before dismissing, settling, compromising,
or terminating an action is a legally cognizable injury.
An informed consent action may also eliminate the burden-
some "trial within a trial" requirement. What the client needs to
show in an informed consent action is not that the underlying
action would have been meritorious, but rather, that a particular
undisclosed risk was present; that the client, or a reasonable per-
son in the client's position, would have chosen a different course
of action if he knew of the risk; and that the risk materialized,
causing him injury.3 18
314 . SCHNABEL, BECK & KEITFL, SOME ASPECTS AND ISSUES OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE,
DEFENDING THE PROFESSIONAL 329-31 (1982).
315. See BINDER, supra note 5, at 135-53, 157-86. See also MODEL RULES, supra note
9, Rule 2.1.
316. See BINDER, supra note 5, at 135-53, 157-86. See also MODEL RULES, supra note
9, Rule 2.1.
317. MALLEN, supra note 2, § 16.1.
318. An example would be if an attorney knew or should have known that the high-
est appellate court was currently reconsidering a liability issue present in the client's
case, but the attorney counseled the client not to settle the case without disclosing the
high court's reconsideration of the issue. The high court then reverses, and the client's
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Moreover, several defenses or exceptions are particularly
adaptable to an informed consent action: assumption of risk,
release, waiver, abandonment, and ratification. "The keystone of
the [assumption of risk] defense is both a comprehension and
willful assumption of the risk .... The defense may lie where the
attorney adequately and competently explains to the client the
risks of various strategic alternatives ... then, the risk becomes
the client's . ".3.."'19 Thus, if an attorney has a duty of informed
consent, and does not breach that duty, an attorney can defend
a legal malpractice action by showing that the client was made
aware of the risks and made an informed choice to proceed in a
particular manner.
Further, a client could ratify320 a decision made by the at-
torney in the absence of the client's informed consent if the law-
yer made a belated full disclosure of the risks, advantages, and
disadvantages of his decision, and the client ratified the attor-
ney's actions.321
The authors also suggest that a client should be able to ex-
pressly waive the right to make an informed choice. If a client
does not wish to be advised, consulted, and informed, but rather,
affirmatively and intelligently chooses to permit his attorney to
case is dismissed on summary judgment. Here, the client need only prove that a reasona-
ble person in his position would have accepted the settlement offer if he had known of
the risk.
319. MALLEN, supra note 2, § 17.3.
320. See generally MALLEN, supra note 2, § 17.11. Ratification must be based on full
disclosure and knowledge of the consequences. Id.
Then, again, it has been said, that the plaintiff afterwards ratified all the proceed-
ings of the defendant, and expressed his satisfaction in the most unequivocal man-
ner. If this were with a full knowledge of all the transactions, the ratification
would have a most important bearing. But a ratification, made in ignorance of
material facts, cannot give validity to the acts of an attorney in the conduct of a
suit, or repel the imputation of fraud. To give any effect, therefore, to any expres-
sions of this nature, the previous foundation must be laid, that there has been a
full disclosure of facts on the part of the attorney, and that the ratification is the
result of a judgment acting upon knowledge, and not upon a blind personal confi-
dence in the general integrity of the agent.
Id. at n.4, quoting Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386, 1391 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No.
17733).
321. For example, if the lawyer filed a complaint in one of several possible forums
without discussing the choice of forum with the client, but prior to the time the statute
of limitations ran, or issue preclusion applied, the lawyer consulted with the client and
the client knowingly approved the lawyer's choice, the client would be deemed to have
ratified the lawyer's act, despite the lack of informed consent.
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make decisions on his behalf, the client should be permitted to
make that choice. Although prospective releases from malprac-
tice liability are expressly prohibited by the Model Code and the
Model Rules,s22 as a matter of fairness the lawyer should be per-
mitted to include release language for issues concerning the duty
to inform in an informed consent waiver agreement. 2 8 A client
cannot be permitted to waive his right to informed consent and
then sue a lawyer for depriving him of that right.
Lastly, the authors suggest that the duty to inform might be
mitigated in certain circumstances, such as where time is of the
essence and the attorney must make some decision immediately
to protect the client.3 24 Of course, the attorney would still be ob-
ligated to fully inform the client of his decision and of the risks,
advantages, and disadvantages of that decision, as soon thereaf-
ter as possible. Although an emergency might justify an attorney
acting without client consultation and consent, it can never jus-
tify an attorney's failure to subsequently advise the client of all
the facts and circumstances and take whatever corrective mea-
sures are possible if the client does not ratify the attorney's
decision.
B. Policy Issues
A recognition of an informed consent action in legal mal-
practice undoubtedly will engender substantial criticism from
segments of the lawyer population satisfied with the status quo.
As mentioned earlier in this Article, lawyers have resisted pro-
fessional liability standards that are applied to other profes-
sions. Despite erosion of some barriers, malpractice remainsdifficult to prove and fraught with pitfalls for the unwitting
322. See MODEL CODE, supra note 141, DR 6-102(A); MODEL RULES, supra note 9,
Rule 1.8(h).
323. The authors expressly distinguish here between a waiver and release which re-
lieves the attorney of the duty to inform, and a prospective release of liability for failure
to inform in the absence of a waiver, which should never be permitted in any case.
324. See Sockolof v. Eden Point N. Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 421 So. 2d 716, 728
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (lawyer was justified in settling client's case where client told
lawyer "[d]o the best you can under the circumstances" and impending trial portended
an extremely disadvantageous result that could only be avoided by an immediate
settlement).
325. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff."" Any effort to expand the limits of liability will face
the same opposition that has managed to narrow the liability of
attorneys over the years. In light of this new approach to in-
formed consent outlined herein, however, these criticisms will
not be upheld.
The first anticipated criticism against an expansion of in-
formed consent is that recognition of the action will produce a
floodgate of litigation. Aside from the fact that this red herring
is thrown up at virtually every innovation in the law,327 informed
consent is unlikely to result in substantially more legal malprac-
tice actions. Under the formulations of earlier commentators,
giving the client control of all decisions in the representation," 8
such concerns may be more valid. If the client can sue over every
difference of opinion with the attorney or over any item of infor-
mation he failed to receive, there is at least a potential for
abuse. Whether such abuse would be significant enough to be
characterized as a flood, or whether other means could be devel-
oped to control the abuse, are questions that do not need to be
answered under the informed consent theory. Since informed
consent is already recognized in a number of areas,32 9 extension
of the action to other limited situations hardly constitutes open
season on attorneys.
A related issue involves insurance rates and legal fees. The
argument is that increasing the exposure of attorneys to new
and expanded liability will lead inevitably to higher malpractice
insurance rates. These increases may force some lawyers out of
private practice and lead some lawyers to drop professional lia-
bility coverage in favor of self-insurance or refuse to handle
cases they otherwise would handle. In many cases, increased in-
surance premiums would be passed along to clients in the form
of higher fees, further limiting the availability of legal services to
clients with substantial means. The response to this argument is
that insurance premiums reflect the risks associated with the
practice of law. Lawyers have a duty to protect their clients in
326. KE'roN, supra note 2, § 32.
327. See, e.g., Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883); Weitl v. Moes, 311
N.W.2d 259, 266 (Iowa 1981) (recognizing child's right to maintain wrongful death action
for loss of parental companionship).
328. See generally supra note 2 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
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case such a risk causes injury. Whether such costs should or
would be passed along to clients really begs the question. If a
professional has a duty to act in a particular way, then one of
the costs of doing business is insurance against the breach of
that duty. The incidence of informed consent actions is not
likely to increase insurance premiums significantly any more
than it will create a floodgate of litigation.
A final criticism of informed consent is that recognition of
this cause of action will erode the fundamental attorney-client
relationship. Opponents to informed consent may contend that
by creating an action based upon inadequate communication,
the duty to inform will impede open and candid dialogue be-
tween attorneys and clients. Attorneys will always be on their
guard, unwilling to freely say anything that might some day re-
turn to haunt them, and they will resort to giving civil "Miranda
warnings" for all their advice. Such a scenario is basically un-
realistic, and similar arguments preceded passage of Model
Rules 1.2 and 1.4.330 The thrust of the rules and of the informed
consent doctrine is to open the channels of communication."'
By making it a duty to provide adequate information to clients,
courts could foster confidence in the legal profession. A major
criticism of lawyers is that they do not communicate, 3 2 and as a
result many clients do not trust their lawyers.3 33 The authors
suggest that recognition of a duty to inform will foster rather
than retard good attorney-client relationships.
IV. Conclusion
This Article has presented the basic case for creating a
cause of action in legal malpractice law based on a theory of in-
formed consent. Recognition of such an action would be consis-
tent with the law as it applies to other professions, particularly
medicine.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 34 enumer-
ate a professional responsibility to provide adequate information
330. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, Rules 1.2, 1.4.
331. Id.
332. See Peck, supra note 1, at 1307.
333. Id.
334. MODEL RULES, supra note 9.
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enabling informed consent of clients in a number of distinct ar-
eas. These requirements can and should be recognized as estab-
lishing a civil duty to obtain the client's informed consent in
those situations articulated by the Rules. Such a duty should be
actionable in situations where a lawyer's breach causes injury.
The standard for disclosure and for causation should be an ob-
jective one based upon the reasonable attorney and reasonable
client.
Whether the informed consent action should be extended to
other situations in the future is beyond the scope of this Article.
The limits of the action can evolve over time as courts evaluate
the developing standard using the experience of actual cases.
The duty to inform is unlikely at any time in the future to be-
come a pervasive responsibility subject to civil liability whenever
the client does not get his way. While greater client control of
litigation and enhanced requirements that attorneys provide
enough information to permit informed decisionmaking are
laudable goals and important principles, they fall short of re-
quiring the imposition of civil liability for their violation in all
situations. As described in this Article, the informed consent ac-
tion is both workable and desirable. It will promote better com-
munication between attorneys and their clients, while affording
protection to clients in situations where lawyers breach this fun-
damental duty.
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